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Editors’ Note: Greta R. Krippner’s Capitalizing on 
Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance 
(Harvard 2011) was the subject of an Author Meets 
Critics session at the Social Science History 
Association meeting in Boston in November 2011. 
These are the revised comments from Frank 
Dobbin, Isaac Martin, and Bill Sewell with Greta 
Krippner’s response. We would like to thank Ho-
fung Hung for organizing and guest-editing the 
symposium. 
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Comments by Frank Dobbin 
Harvard University 
 
Greta Krippner submitted Capitalizing on Crisis to 
Harvard University Press at the end of the summer 
of 2008, before the Great Recession began.  I read 
it as a member of the press board, and we all 
thought Krippner had a career ahead as a 
psychic.  There had been rumblings from 
economists, like Simon Johnson at MIT, about the 
rise of finance and its dominance of the American 
economy, and there have been some rumblings 
about the growing frequency of crises since the 
deregulation of a generation ago, in the work of 
David Moss at Harvard Business School for 
instance.  But, and this is hard to remember 
through the fog of the last 3 years, in 2008 we still 
thought we understood the crises of recent 
memory.  Crony capitalism in East Asia set off one 
crisis, and that wasn’t of our doing.  Greed set off 
the Enron/Worldcom/Tyco debacle of 2001, and 
Sarbanes Oxley was going to fix that through better 
accounting.   
 What made this a great 
read in the fall of 2008 
was not that it diagnosed 
the recent crisis, but that it 
detailed the conditions for 
the rise of that crisis, but 
stopped in 2001.  Greta 
Krippner saw the historical 
roots of this crisis before 
we knew there would be a 
crisis.  She detailed the 
conditions that invited crises. 
 The big picture is that to deal with economic 
crises since the 1970s, Washington introduced 
broad regulatory reforms that set the stage for a 
series of economic crises.  These regulatory 
reforms ushered in the financialization of the 
American economy.  We saw a rapid shift in the 
core business of the United States, from 
manufacturing not to service so much as to finance 
per se.  As Simon Johnson pointed out, when the 
market peaked in 2001, finance accounted for 40% 
of profits in the American economy.   
 Krippner’s analysis takes us through three main 
policy shifts that produced this unprecedented 
growth of financialization, by which she means not 
only the staggering rise of the financial sector, but 
the growth of financial activities in non-financial 
firms.  The business unit that was G.M.’s loan 
department, the General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation, in many years made more money for 
the automaker than automaking did.  Likewise for 
Ford’s and General Electric’s financing 
divisions.  The economy has increasingly grown 
via new-fangled financial instruments and 
securitization.  You can now bet not only on hog 
futures, but against low income households paying 
off their mortgages, and for the continuing 
popularity of the Beatles backlist.  Krippner’s 
second chapter details how this happened 
brilliantly.  Her colleague at Michigan, Jerry Davis, 
had done some of this in his 2009 book, Managed 
by the Markets.  But where Davis largely describes 
the change, Krippner traces its political roots.   
 It would be tempting to build an argument 
about the policy decisions that encouraged 
financialization around a conspiracy theory, or a 
narrow power theory, attributing blame for 
growing, structured, volatility in the economy to 
Wall Street titans.  Krippner 
instead makes a 
sophisticated historical 
argument.  The fact is, as 
Krippner shows, political 
expediency rather than 
power politics produced the 
key policy changes, and the 
effects of those changes 
were not anticipated by 
anyone.  No one planned the 
rise of finance, speculation, 
and bubbles, and the top 
1/10 of 1 percent did not design it with malice 
aforethought.  Today’s elite came of age in the 
1970s, when the star CEO took home a million 
dollars a year, and lived to see a world in which the 
star hedge fund manager took home five billion.   
 Instead of a story of conspiracy, Krippner tells 
a story of an increasingly complex economy, with 
political leaders who made decisions based on 
expediency that piled up one on another to alter the 
basic dynamics of the economy.   Perhaps the most 
sobering lesson from the book is that we live in an 
economy so complex that neither scientists nor 
soothsayers can predict the effects of one 
regulatory choice or another.   
“Krippner … makes a 
sophisticated historical 
argument.  The fact is, as Krippner 
shows, political expediency rather 
than power politics produced the 
key policy changes, and the effects 
of those changes were not 
anticipated by anyone.” 
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 Krippner shows us that from the 1970s the state 
dealt with ongoing distributional conflicts and 
particular economic crises by changing regulations 
in ways that promoted financialization.  The story 
is less about power politics than about efforts to 
maintain state legitimacy and to prevent unruliness 
from below.  To this extent the book echoes Raghu 
Rajan’s Fault Lines, written after the crisis, which 
ties the crisis (which he can take credit for 
predicting in earlier work) more narrowly to 
federal efforts to expand home ownership to 
preclude class backlash in the context of growing 
inequality.  Krippner likewise takes up the theme 
of politicians attempting to preclude political crisis 
resulting from the explosion of inequality, but she 
explains financialization more generally, not just 
the mortgage crisis, and traces it to a series of 
political decisions, rather than to congressional 
efforts to appease the working class with 
mortgages.   
 The core chapters address key federal policy 
changes that set the country on a new 
course.  Based on primary archival research, these 
chapters contribute not only a new interpretation of 
events, but original research on the debates behind 
key policy shifts.   
 Washington made 3 moves that promoted 
financialization.  It deregulated financial markets in 
the 1970s.  From the 1980s, it encouraged global 
flows of capital to the U.S.  And the Federal 
Reserve altered monetary policy beginning in the 
late 1970s.  First, the sustained economic crisis of 
the 1970s threatened to produce political 
strife.  The oil crisis, economic stagnation, and a 
record cost of credit hit the middle and working 
classes hard.  Deregulation of financial markets 
would free up flows of capital across different sorts 
of markets, reducing mortgage rates but also 
unleashing greater competition for 
investment.  The foundation was set for 
financialization.   
 Second, in the 1980s the Reagan administration 
unwittingly opened up global capital flows, and 
became addicted to foreign credit.  This happened 
as the Fed, under Paul Volker, sustained high 
interest rates when global credit flows were in their 
infancy.  The high interest rates, and security, 
offered by Washington drew unprecedented flows 
of capital from abroad, which allowed Reagan to 
cut taxes without making equal cuts to 
spending.  Reagan thus overcame the impending 
fiscal crisis of the state, and investors were soon 
accustomed to thinking globally.  A global 
financial market was on the rise.   
 Third, by the early 1980s, the Fed moved away 
from a strategy of closely controlling the supply of 
credit, and largely abandoned adjustments based on 
the money supply.  Reluctant to take sole 
responsibility for the health of the economy, 
Washington moved toward allowing markets to 
determine the availability of credit.  Without any 
central decision-making capacity, markets turned 
out to be credit boosters.  This led to an unexpected 
expansion of credit. 
 Where would we be without all of these policy 
shifts?  While it is clear that political expediency 
was the motive behind each of these changes, it is 
equally clear that without these changes, the United 
States would not have seen the rapid move toward 
financialization that it has seen.  Washington might 
not have been able to tame the political discontent 
tied to the stagflation, and sky high interest rates, 
of the 1970s.  More generally, the global economic 
system might not have been globalized.  China 
might not own us.   
 Krippner shows that politicians and bureaucrats 
are constrained by considerations of legitimacy and 
by political pressures even in what look like cold 
calculations about how to manage the 
economy.  There are no decisions that are 
apolitical.  At the same time, the changes that 
public policy wrought were largely inadvertent, and 
so if indeed the financial sector has now captured 
Washington, that change is a consequence, not a 
cause, of the regulatory shifts that led to the 
growing economic and political power of finance.   
 Krippner modernizes Polanyi’s agenda 
brilliantly, showing us that the economic world we 
see before us is not necessarily the best, and 
certainly not the only, option we have.  But 
Krippner goes beyond Polanyi, whose theme was 
that a nascent commercial class pushed for an end 
to policies that advantaged the gentry, and the 
opening of markets.  She shows us that what has 
happened in recent years is not really a 
deregulation of financial markets, but a 
reregulation of markets, with new divisions 
separating financial from non-financial institutions, 
new mechanisms for establishing interest rates, and 
new boundaries on credit markets.  These changes 
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may all look like the opening of markets, but the 
state has not retreated so much as made decisions 
to handle political crises that had unanticipated 
consequences.  We have a new set of regulations, 
not the absence of regulations.  While we think that 
the economy evolves according to its own logic, in 
fact it changes in large measure in response to 
changes in political structures.     
 I end with two questions.  Not to suggest that 
Krippner should have written the book I would 
have written, or done more in this book, but to 
suggest that the book begs for more research, both 
at the meso level and at the macro level. 
 One question at the meso, organizational, 
level.  While Krippner points out that the studies of 
the shareholder value movement, which also 
purport to explain financialization, set political 
decisions aside and do not explain them, she 
doesn’t fully assess how much of the change was 
wrought by the big public policy shifts she points 
to, and how much by change in how corporations 
operate.  How much of the change can we 
apportion to the rise of the shareholder value 
paradigm of corporate management?  It is a 
complicated question, but let’s take the example of 
corporate debt.  The opening up of credit that 
Krippner documents helped corporations to take on 
substantially more bond debt.  Corporate debt 
nearly doubled after the 1970s as a proportion of 
equity.  This came about for a variety of reasons, 
but the shareholder value paradigm supported debt 
as a way to create a market for corporate control 
and as a way to leverage the value of equity by 
returning to shareholders 
not only profits made on 
equity, but profits made on 
borrowed money.   The 
corporate bond and junk 
bond markets thus fueled 
the growth of Wall Street 
for much of the period, 
because it was investment 
banks that were issuing 
and managing the debt, 
and handling the 
acquisitions, spinoffs, and 
bankruptcies that erupted 
when firms had trouble 
paying off debt.  We need to better understand how 
much the public policy shifts that Krippner 
describes, and how much the shareholder value 
revolution that Michael Useem and Gerald Davis 
describe, contributed to financialization.   
 One question at the macro level.  Krippner 
gives us an historical account of the rise of policy 
decisions such as financial deregulation and 
Volker’s interest rate spike, and traces how they 
contribute to financialization.  Her broad argument 
is that the state faced fiscal and legitimacy crises, 
and these reactions were politically expedient.  But 
seen from abroad, these reactions were peculiarly 
American.  In another political context, where the 
state has historically played a different role in the 
economy, we might have seen very different 
solutions.   In what ways were these solutions 
constrained by American state capacities, and by 
the American conception of the role of the state in 
the economy?  Would a state like Germany or 
France or Japan, in which the state had historically 
played a greater role in regulating credit, interest 
rates, and international flows of capital, have 
responded to America’s crises quite 
differently?  Perhaps American political culture 
and structure made these policy choices not just 
possible, but likely.   
 
 
Comments by Isaac Martin 
University of California, San Diego 
 
Greta Krippner’s Capitalizing on Crisis is an 
important study of the rise of finance in the United 
States. It combines a careful quantitative 
description of 
financialization, defined 
as “the growing 
importance of financial 
activities as a source of 
profits” (2011: 27), with a 
richly detailed historical 
narrative that purports to 
explain financialization by 
describing how policy 
makers confronted with a 
structural crisis made a 
series of decisions that 
radically increased the 
profit that could be made 
on financial activities. I came away from the book 
convinced of the most general argument—that 
“It combines a careful quantitative 
description … with a richly detailed 
historical narrative that purports to 
explain financialization by 
describing how policy makers 
confronted with a structural crisis 
made a series of decisions that 
radically increased the profit that 
could be made on financial 
activities.” 
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financialization occurred in response to a general 
social and fiscal crisis—but also convinced that we 
need more research to be sure whether this book 
has identified the correct agents and causal 
mechanisms by which the crisis caused that social 
change. 
 The first chapter of the book is given over to 
documenting that financialization occurred. It 
provides a rigorous conceptual discussion of 
financialization, and presents a variety of possible 
indicators of the concept. Krippner delved deeply 
into the data, and her Chapter 1 makes a strong 
case that the apparent turn to finance is not an 
artifact of the particular indicator chosen, nor is it 
just one aspect of a broader post-industrial shift in 
the economy. It is a real shift. I think the book will 
be seen as definitive on this point. Before reading 
the book, I thought financialization was an 
unnecessarily big word. After reading this book, I 
see financialization as one of the most important 
social changes of the late twentieth century in the 
United States.  
 The book also offers an innovative theoretical 
account of financialization that, in broad outlines, I 
find plausible. The most general argument of the 
book is that the path to financialization was paved 
by public policy. In particular, Krippner argues that 
policy makers deregulated financial activities in 
order to allay a series of crises that beset the 
advanced capitalist economies beginning in the late 
1960s—a social crisis associated with class 
conflict, a fiscal crisis of the state, and a 
legitimation crisis. She also points out that these 
were facets of the same underlying crisis, the basic 
problem of how to divide up resources when 
economic growth slows down. As the allusions to 
O’Connor (1973) and Habermas (1975) might 
suggest, the fundamental logic of this argument is 
broadly Marxian. It rests on the premises that 
capitalist economies are characterized by 
competing resource demands between broadly 
defined social groups; that this conflict can be 
allayed but not resolved by economic growth; that 
the conflict between contradictory demands comes 
to head when growth slows; that political actors 
respond to the crisis by setting up new institutional 
rules that will help get growth started again; and 
that the new rules work for a little while, but 
ultimately just set the stage for the next crisis. That 
plot will sound familiar to anyone who has read 
Capital, and the logic and assumptions are quite 
close to those of the “social structures of 
accumulation” school (see Kotz, McDonough and 
Reich 1994). 
 But is this argument correct? Was the crisis a 
fundamental cause of financialization? The book 
offers case study evidence that the intertwined 
crisis of growth, public finance, and governance 
was much on the mind of policy makers who 
deregulated finance in the late twentieth-century 
United States, but it would take comparison to test 
whether the crisis was actually a cause of 
financialization. The book does not provide such a 
comparison.  It does provides the necessary 
conceptual building blocks for a comparative 
analysis, however, and a brief exercise in applying 
Krippner's measures of financialization to 
international data increased my confidence in the 
argument of Capitalizing on Crisis.  
 Figure 1 illustrates the data that persuaded me. 
The figure presents time series of the ratio of 
financial-sector profits to non-financial sector 
profits for twelve countries--including all countries 
for which data prior to 1990 are available in the 
OECD STAN database. Though Krippner's 
preferred measures of financialization are based on 
American national accounts and published tax data 
sources that are idiosyncratic to the U.S., this is a 
reasonably close approximation of one of her 
preferred measures of financialization (cf. Krippner 
2011, Chapter 1, Figure 8) and can be calculated 
from internationally harmonized data published by 
the OECD. The “financial sector” for the purpose 
of this graph refers to OECD industry category 
6574 (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate); and 
“profits” refer to the STAN variable “gross 
operating surplus” (GOPS), which is not adjusted 
for depreciation, nor for financial accounts payable 
and receivable. In order to facilitate comparison, 
the graphs are ordered from the greatest ratios (left) 
to least (right), and from steepest slopes (top) to 
shallowest (bottom).  
 If Krippner's argument is correct, then we 
should expect to observe financialization quite 
generally throughout the OECD, since the social, 
fiscal, and legitimation crises of the 1960s and 
1970s were also quite general. And that is indeed 
what we observe. The available data series start in 
the 1980s, and they reveal a more or less secular 
increase in the ratio of financial-sector to non-
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financial-sector profits almost everywhere.
 
The 
United States stands out in this group of rich 
countries for having achieved the greatest degree of 
financialization the most rapidly. But the scope of 
the process and its pace in the United States appear 
to differ in degree, not in kind, from the scope and 
pace of financialization in most other rich 
countries.  The ratio increased somewhat more 
slowly in France and Denmark than in the U.S., but 
attained about as high a level. It increased just as 
rapidly in Germany and Japan as in the U.S., 
though from a lower baseline. In short, if we accept 
this measure of financialization, then we must 
conclude that almost all of the most developed 
capitalist economies underwent financialization in 
the late twentieth century. The near-ubiquity of 
financialization seems consistent with the view that 
it was driven by some fundamental process 
common to these developed market economies, 
and the late-twentieth-century fiscal crisis of the 
state is a likely suspect. 
 The comparison also exonerates other likely 
suspects that might be inconsistent with Krippner's 
account. For example, the trend looks basically 
similar despite finance policy regimes that were 
very different in this period. It happened in liberal 
market economies and coordinated market 
economies. It happened in economies with strong 
welfare states and weak welfare states. It happened 
in places where neoliberals took power early and 
places where neoliberals never quite ran the show. 
It happened regardless of the partisan coloration of 
government. And so on. 
 The comparative data also give us something 
quite close to a natural experiment. There was one 
rich democratic country that escaped the fiscal 
crisis of the state in this period by the lucky 
expedient of discovering oil. That country was 
Norway.  And—apart from the banking enclaves of 
Switzerland and Luxembourg, which did not 
financialize only because they were already so 
dependent on finance—Norway appears to be the 
only rich democratic country that did not undergo 
financialization in this period. The ratio of 
financial to non-financial sector profits started low 
and decreased. 
 In short, although the book did not present the 
kind of comparative evidence that would be 
necessary to convince me of its fundamental claim, 
it did give me the conceptual tools to go see for 
myself; and I came away from the data convinced 
that the fiscal crisis of the state in late-twentieth-
century developed capitalist economies was indeed 
a fundamental cause of financialization.  
 But how, exactly, did crisis lead to 
financialization? When it comes to identifying the 
relevant actors and causal mechanisms, the book 
offers a Tocquevillian argument that I found 
initially plausible, but ultimately somewhat less 
convincing. The basic argument is that policy 
makers, rather than, say, financial elites, were the 
key decision-makers. The narrative does make a 
strong case for this view. It spells out in careful 
detail who did what, naming names, and presents 
detailed evidence about why those people at that 
moment thought that was the thing to do. (The 
main actors in the narrative are not social classes, 
or class-based organizations such as labor unions 
or industry trade associations. They are voluntary 
interest groups and public officials whose actions 
have unintended consequences. In this respect the 
book belongs to the great tradition of comparative 
historical sociology that poses Marxian questions 
and gives Tocquevillian answers. I thought at some 
points as I read that the book could just as well 
have been called The Old Regime And The 
Financial Revolution.)  
 The general picture of the policy process seems 
true to me, or at least it suits my prior assumptions. 
Policy makers in the narrative appear to be short-
sighted problem solvers, whose primary motivation 
is blame avoidance, who often lack information 
about how the world works and who operate 
according to ad hoc theories rather than stable or 
coherent ideologies. They sometimes respond to 
lobbying but they also worry about re-election and 
about doing their jobs; they are neither 
dispassionate  technocrats, nor consistent 
neoliberal ideologues, nor puppets of capitalists. 
This general depiction is all well supported by the 
data in the book. 
 But the evidence presented in the book did not 
convince me that the particular actors and 
decisions identified in the narrative were, in fact, 
the crucial ones in the rise of finance.  
 In part, I think, I came away from the narrative 
unconvinced because the first part of the book had 
so thoroughly and effectively sold me on 
Krippner's preferred measures of financialization, 
which are all continuous variables. The 
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financialization of the American economy, as 
depicted in the first chapter of the book, thus 
appears to be a continuous trend that has been 
underway since the late 1960s. The bulk of the 
historical narrative, however, concerns discrete 
events—and most of them are discrete events that 
took place well after financialization was 
underway, such as the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
(DIDMCA) of 1980, the 1984 decision to permit 
the Treasury to issue bonds in a form that was 
appealing for institutional investors, and the 1994 
decision by the Federal Reserve to commit publicly 
to a specific interest rate target. There are certainly 
reasons to think that these decisions might have 
contributed to the further financialization of the 
U.S. economy. But they do not correspond to any 
obvious thresholds, turning points, or points of 
inflection in the graphs of financialization 
presented in Chapter 1. (Some of them—
particularly those in the mid-1980s—may 
correspond to points of inflection in some of the 
graphs; at least, I first thought so, but on second 
viewing of the graphs I thought not, and now I 
think is hard to tell one way or another just by 
eyeballing a trend line. There is no clean or 
obvious discontinuity in the data. Perhaps some 
time series analysis could have helped to separate 
signal from noise, so that we could figure out 
which kinks in the graph are the turning points in 
the rise of financialization that are most in need of 
narrative explanation.) In effect the book offers us 
a turbulent and eventful narrative explanation of 
what appears to be a more or less continuous trend.  
 In part, too, I was not sure whether I agreed 
with the narrative explanation because at several 
key points I was not sure what sort of explanation 
was actually on offer. The book is generally silent 
on the relevant counterfactuals. For example, is the 
implied claim that the ratio of financial to non-
financial profits would have risen less if, say, 
Congress had not passed the DIDMCA? How 
much less? (How much less would it have had to 
increase in order for us to say that our economy did 
not undergo financialization?) Such questions 
suggest themselves at several points in the 
narrative, at least to a reader like me. 
 But that is all just to say that Capitalizing on 
Crisis is a book well worth thinking hard about and 
arguing with. It should be seen as an agenda-setting 
book, and I hope it will be. There is obviously 
room here for more research to help fill in the 
picture of financialization. This book convinced 
me that we need that research urgently. 
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Figure 1 
The changing ratio of financial-sector to non-financial-sector profits in twelve rich countries 
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Source: Author's calculations from OECD STAN database (see the text for details). 
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Comments by William H. Sewell, Jr. 
University of Chicago 
 
The first thing to say is that Greta Krippner’s 
Capitalizing on Crisis is a splendid book—one 
from which I have learned an enormous amount. It 
takes on a controversial, complex, and technically 
difficult subject and develops a marvelously clear 
and convincing argument—all in a surprisingly 
brief compass. Her chapter establishing the 
quantitative outlines of the financialization of the 
American economy (which obviously took a lot of 
painstaking work) is extraordinarily clarifying. As 
far as I am concerned, this is the neatest, most 
irrefutable, and most definitive empirical 
demonstration of financialization we are likely to 
see.  
 She then proceeds to use that same laser-like 
intelligence to trace out the specifically political 
path by which financialization happened—the 
legislative, regulatory, and 
policy decisions that led 
from the highly-regulated 
state-steered financial 
regime of the immediate 
post-war decades to the 
deregulated, free-
wheeling, market-steered financial regime that 
crashed so spectacularly in 2008. She disentangles 
and anatomizes in succession the piece-meal but 
cumulatively revolutionary deregulation of the US 
financial regime from the late 1960s to the early 
1980s; the surprising but opportune flood of world 
capital into the US in the 1980s as a consequence 
of the Volker shock and its aftermath; and finally, 
the evolution of the monetary policy of the Federal 
Reserve toward increased reliance on markets from 
Greenspan’s appointment in 1987 to the onset of 
the financial meltdown of 2008. The result is a 
political history of the rise of finance in the United 
States that is unlikely to be surpassed. It’s a 
brilliant achievement. 
 I have nothing but admiration for the clarity 
and persuasiveness of this political story. But I do 
think that Kripner’s decision to concentrate so 
single-mindedly on the purely American and purely 
political and regulatory story leaves some 
important questions unasked and some possibly 
important connections and contexts under-
examined. The rest of my comments will attempt 
to smoke out some of these unasked or under-
examined questions.  
 Characteristically, Krippner indicates 
forthrightly what her explanatory strategy will be 
and contrasts it to previous explanations of the rise 
of financialization: those that see it as repeating the 
speculative dynamics that have plagued capitalist 
economies since the 17
th
 century (think of Charles 
Kindleberger 1978); those that emphasize the 
development of a business ideology of 
“shareholder value” (think of Gerald Davis 2009 or 
Neil Fligstein 2001); and those that see 
financialization as a repeating phase that 
characterises periods of declining hegemonies in 
the capitalist world-system (think of Giovanni 
Arrighi 1994). The first two she criticizes for 
essentially ignoring the importance of politics in 
generating financialization. Krippner criticizes 
Giovanni Arrighi, who certainly emphasizes the 
importance of global politics in the periodic rise of 
financialization, for being 
vague about the actual 
political mechanisms by 
which financialization 
comes about. It is these 
political mechanisms that 
she aims to supply for the 
contemporary American case.  
 Krippner’s strategy is quite familiar to me as a 
historian. It actually reminds me of the kind of 
strictly political history that dominated the field 
when I became a history major, way back in 1961. 
(At this time, social and cultural history were just 
beginning to emerge in American history 
departments.) The strategy of the political 
historians was to focus relentlessly on the doings of 
key political actors, bringing in the larger context 
only when and where it impinged directly on the 
central story. The result, when well done, was 
precisely the sort of clarifying and disentangling 
account that Krippner gives us in this case. It’s 
worth noting that a common theme of such 
histories—as of Krippner’s—is that the historical 
outcomes are rarely the consequence of any 
considered plan on the part of any of the 
protagonists, but rather emerge from the 
improvisations, blunders, and compromises of 
actors making the best of unmasterable 
circumstances. History, this seems to imply, is 
contingency all the way down, without any clear 
“[T]his is the neatest, most irrefu-
table, and most definitive empirical 
demonstration of financialization we 
are likely to see.” 
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direction or generalizable shape. It is a curious 
irony that a contemporary young sociologist 
impatient with the grand but all too vague claims 
of such disciplinary colleagues as Arrighi should 
turn to exactly the kind of narrow but sharp 
empirical investigation of politics that made me, as 
a young historian, wish to reach for the larger 
theories and generalizations I found in the social 
sciences. So, following out this unexpected 
crossing of generational and disciplinary paths, let 
me suggest some issues, most of them having to do 
with underlying dynamics of capitalism as a global 
social system, that seem to have escaped 
Krippner’s political-historical net. 
 First, I was struck by how often in Krippner’s 
account it was the effects of financial innovations 
that induced the political actors to change 
regulatory frameworks. Even in the highly 
regulated environment of the 1960s and 1970s, 
such novel financial instruments as certificates of 
deposit, Eurodollars, securitization of mortgages, 
money-market funds, or interest-bearing checking 
accounts seem to be constantly popping up, 
frustrating the regulators and forcing them to relax 
one regulation or another. Hyman Minsky (1986), 
whom I think Krippner dismisses rather too 
quickly, argues cogently that there is a tendency 
inherent in capitalism for financial entrepreneurs to 
continually develop new products that maneuver 
around existing regulatory frameworks. (Of course, 
we’ve been treated to particularly spectacular 
examples of this undermining effect of financial 
innovation in the past decade or so.) Although 
Krippner doesn’t emphasize this aspect of her 
story, on my reading of her text, this seemingly 
perennial aspect of the historical dynamic of 
capitalism emerges as a significant driver of the 
political story she tells. 
 Second, Krippner insists that financialization 
was not a conscious creation of her political actors, 
but rather an unanticipated consequence of their 
decisions. This is an important corrective to the 
rather vulgar Marxist accounts of, for example, 
David Harvey (2005) or Gerard Dumésnil and 
Dominique Lévy (2011), who assume that it was 
capitalists who drove deregulation from the 
beginning. But granting Krippner’s point, it seems 
clear to me that once the initial deregulation got 
under way, the capitalists who benefited from it 
used some of their rising wealth to increasingly rig 
the political and regulatory system in such a way as 
to further reinforce their advantage—as Jacob 
Hacker and Paul Pierson’s Winner-Take-All 
Politics (2010) brilliantly documents. If 
financialization was an unintended consequence of 
piece-meal efforts to deal with a rolling economic 
crisis, the creation of the 1 percent vs 99 percent 
society we Americans now live in was fully 
intended. (I’d also like to put in a plug for Lévy 
and Dumesnil as inspired data-hounds. I think 
they’re among the few whose quantitative 
dissection of recent economic trends rivals 
Krippner’s.) 
 Third, the world or international context of the 
American developments drops almost entirely out 
of sight in Krippner’s account, except when some 
action from outside the United States directly 
requires the American actors to respond. Thus, 
Krippner mentions in passing the development of a 
Eurodollar market, which, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
made it possible for American businesses to get 
around the limits imposed on interest rates in US 
banks (p. 67). But she doesn’t tell us that 
Eurodollars were only one instance of continuing 
financial innovation going on in European and 
world financial markets—innovations that were of 
course beyond the reach of US regulators but that 
formed a crucial and continually evolving context 
for American decision makers throughout 
Krippner’s period. Even chapter 3, entitled “The 
Reagan Administration Discovers the Global 
Economy,” tells us very little about what was 
actually happening in the global economy. Rather, 
it emphasizes that the Reagan administration 
learned—much to its surprise—that foreign 
(especially Japanese) investors would fund 
spiraling American deficits once Fed chairman 
Volker’s tight money policy resulted in record high 
interest rates in the United States—thus launching 
the debt-fueled bubble economy that lasted right up 
to 2008. There is, for example, no mention of the 
dizzying rise of London’s City (let alone Hong 
Kong or Singapore or the Cayman Islands) as a 
global competitor of Wall Street; no mention of the 
Plaza accord of 1985, in which representatives of 
the governments of the US, Japan, the UK, 
Germany, and France agreed to sharply depreciate 
the dollar against the Yen and the Deutchmark; 
hardly a hint that financialization was, by 2000, a 
characteristic of essentially all the advanced 
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capitalist countries, not merely the United States; 
no discussion of the rise of China and the other 
“emerging economies,” which have so sharply 
changed the balance of economic and financial 
power in global capitalism since the mid-1990s.  
 In her discussion of Arrighi in her introduction, 
Krippner indicates that she does not “take issue 
with the theoretical argument that financialization 
is a property of the world capitalist system ....” The 
problem with this argument, she indicates, is that it 
operates at too high a level of abstraction, making 
unclear the actual mechanisms that made 
financialization possible. Indeed, she affirms that 
Arrighi’s “notion that financialization offered a 
‘solution’ to the crisis of the 1970s is an intriguing 
idea—and [she continues] one that directly informs 
my own research” (p. 13-4, emphasis mine). This 
led me to expect that once she had specified the 
mechanisms of the American case, she would cycle 
back in the conclusion of her book to Arrighi’s 
argument and give us some account of how her 
discoveries about the US case might help us to 
understand better the macro-evolutions that Arrighi 
traces. But in fact her concluding remarks remain 
entirely on the US scale—arguing that as a 
consequence of the 2008 meltdown, the US now 
must face up to the difficult political choices that 
financialization postponed for some thirty years, 
perhaps even forming some version of the “public 
household” that Daniel Bell (1973) had called for 
in the 1970s. But as desirable as it would be for the 
United States to get its public household in order, 
one wonders how far this would go toward solving 
the problems that face us and the rest of the 
thoroughly globalized world we now inhabit.  
 In sum, I would like to invite Krippner to use 
her accumulated knowledge of the US case and her 
laser-like analytical intelligence to say more about 
four issues: (1) the importance during her period 
and into the future of the long-standing tendency of 
capitalist financial systems to produce continuing 
financial innovations; (2) the successful efforts by 
very wealthy capitalists since the 1980s to rig the 
American political and regulatory system to their 
advantage; (3) the significance of changes in the 
world capitalist system for her story about 
American financialization and of American 
financialization for the dynamics of the world 
capitalist system; and (4) what the US might be 
able to do now, both domestically and as the still 
hegemonic power in the capitalist world, to move 
the national and global public households in a 
more positive direction.  
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Reply to Critics 
Greta R. Krippner 
University of Michigan 
 
It’s extremely gratifying to have one’s work read 
so carefully by three such esteemed scholars.
1
  I am 
very grateful to have received such perceptive and 
challenging comments, and I would also like to 
                     
1
 Jennifer Klein of Yale University was also a participant in 
the original author-meets-critics session held at the annual 
meeting of the Social Science History Association in Novem-
ber of 2011.  I am grateful to Daniel Hirschman for valuable 
feedback on an earlier version of this comment. 
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express my appreciation to Ho-Fung Hung for 
organizing this exchange.   
 This may be one of those things that I shouldn’t 
admit in public, but it took me a very long time to 
discover what this book is really about and also 
why I wanted to write it.  This makes it extremely 
stimulating for me to learn what others think the 
book is about (and indeed to consider what it could 
have been about had I not written it in the way that 
I did).  But before I engage my critics, I’d like to 
briefly describe the book’s arguments as I’ve 
thought about them 
during the years I’ve 
been working on this 
project.  Of course, it’s 
easiest to note the things 
the book is not.  As Bill 
Sewell observes, 
Capitalizing on Crisis is 
not a book about recent 
transformations in the 
global economy, nor 
does it offer a 
comparative study of 
financialization across advanced industrial nations.  
It is not a book about the class politics 
undergirding the rise of finance.  Perhaps most 
shockingly of all, it is not really a book about 
finance, although finance is its subject matter.  
Rather, this book is about the perennial tensions 
between democratic politics and market 
economies, and the way in which attempts to 
contain if not resolve those contradictions in the 
late twentieth century launched our society on a 
path that led quite inadvertently to the dramatic 
expansion of financial markets, with far reaching 
consequences that we are still coming to grips with 
as a society today.  While there has been some 
speculation as to whether I am a Marxist or a 
Tocquevillian, I think this theme marks me clearly 
as a Polanyian.  It was Polanyi who observed that 
the attempt to sever the economy from politics in 
market society was a singular historical 
departure—a development that made the 
democratic forms of capitalism that were 
institutionalized in the twentieth century 
particularly vulnerable to episodes of crisis. 
 More specifically, my book argues that the turn 
to finance in the U.S. economy in recent decades 
originated in the state’s attempts to avoid 
distributional conflict as the long period of postwar 
prosperity came to an end beginning in the late 
1960s and 1970s.  In this respect, the turn to 
finance—or financialization, the term I use in the 
book—can be regarded as a kind of successor to 
inflation.  When robust growth in the American 
economy stalled, inflation initially served to 
disguise this development, allowing Americans to 
feel richer than they in fact were and thereby 
avoiding distributional conflict.  But only for a 
time.
2
  Eventually, the jig was up, and as 
Americans’ tolerance for 
inflation wore thin, 
policymakers faced the 
prospect of having to 
assume responsibility for 
directly allocating resources 
between competing social 
priorities.  At each such 
juncture, policymakers 
made a fateful choice: they 
passed this unpalatable task 
to the market, first by 
deregulating domestic 
financial markets, then by tapping into global 
capital markets, and finally by innovating new 
methods of implementing monetary policy that 
allowed policymakers to conceal their 
responsibility for unfavorable economic outcomes.  
In each such case, the political cover offered by the 
market also involved a loss of control over policy 
outcomes, unleashing a dramatic expansion of 
credit, as well as introducing a great deal of 
                     
2
 As Albert Hirschman (1980) observed, as long as inflation 
remained at relatively low levels, it served to dissipate distri-
butional tensions.  This reflected the fact that inflation created 
a game of “leapfrog” in which it was never totally clear who 
was winning and who was losing.  For example, a trade union 
that obtained a favorable wage settlement from employers 
momentarily secured an advantage, until these higher wage 
costs translated into higher prices, eroding the real value of 
the goods and services that the wage could purchase.  Once 
these price increases became generalized across the economy, 
workers whose real wage had decreased would push for an-
other wage increase, and the process began again.  This cycle 
could repeat endlessly, with each group securing only tempo-
rary gains, and yet the sequence of moves and countermoves 
tended to vent distributional conflict (see also Goldthorpe 
1987).  Of course, once inflation increased beyond a certain 
threshold, the consequences of price changes for distribution-
al outcomes became clear, and inflation exacerbated rather 
than eased underlying social tensions. 
“It was Polanyi who observed that 
the attempt to sever the economy 
from politics in market society was a 
singular historical departure—a 
development that made the 
democratic forms of capitalism that 
were institutionalized in the 
twentieth century particularly 
vulnerable to episodes of crisis.” 
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volatility into the economy, both of which created 
propitious conditions for the turn to finance.  In 
this sense, I suggest that the financialization of the 
U.S. economy was not a conscious policy 
objective, but an inadvertent result of the state’s 
attempt to solve other problems. 
 Now, in response to some of the issues raised 
by my critics, I want to be clear that in putting 
forward this argument, I offer less an explanation 
for financialization than an interpretation of it.  My 
purpose in the book is not to provide a tight causal 
account of the financialization of the U.S. 
economy, and indeed I am skeptical that such an 
account could be successful.  As the growing 
literature on this subject has made clear, this is a 
multiply-determined phenomenon involving 
developments in markets and firms as well as the 
state actions that are the focus of the book.  Given 
this complexity, Frank Dobbin would like to know 
how to assess the relative contributions of state 
policies and changes in managerial practices that 
have been the focus of most of the literature to 
date.  I will disappoint Dobbin by acknowledging 
that I cannot conceive of a way to partition the 
variance between firm, state, and market in a 
rigorous manner.  I’ll also reveal my Polanyian 
colors again by suggesting that even were such an 
exercise possible, it would perhaps miss the point.  
While I’ve trained my attention on the state for 
purposes of analysis in the book, the actions of 
state policymakers and market actors were deeply 
intertwined as financialization unfolded: the 
changing regulatory environment shaped firm 
actions at every juncture (and was in turn shaped 
by them).  I tend to refer to state policies as 
“creating conditions conducive to” rather than 
“causing” financialization not to be evasive, but 
precisely to acknowledge this intertwining.
3
  In 
short, my objective is not to argue against accounts 
that give greater attention to developments inside 
firms than I do, but rather to place such accounts 
on a firmer foundation by explicitly theorizing the 
state actions that made the reorientation of firms to 
                     
3 To avoid confusion, I should note that acknowledging the 
co-constitution of state and market actions in this manner 
does not amount to a claim that the interests of state policy-
makers and financial elites are identical.  Indeed, I am critical 
of the lurking instrumentalism that I find in some of the litera-
ture on precisely this point (on which more below). 
financial markets in the post-1970s period both 
possible and likely. 
 For related reasons, I am not troubled by the 
lack of a tight coupling between the policy changes 
that I indicate as most important and the empirical 
evidence that I present for financialization.  But I 
do disagree somewhat with Isaac Martin’s 
characterization of how the policy changes I 
highlight line up with the empirical evidence I 
present for the financialization of the U.S. 
economy.  The book identifies three main policy 
changes as particularly consequential for the 
subsequent development of financialization: 1) the 
deregulation of domestic financial markets 
occurring over the 1970s and culminating in 
passage of legislation in 1980; 2) the growing 
dependence of the U.S. economy on foreign capital 
inflows to finance deficits beginning in the early 
1980s; and 3) the radical change of course of U.S. 
monetary policy initiated with the so-called 
“Volcker shock” in 1979.  In short, my narrative 
suggests that the key changes were in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, which on both measures I develop 
is consistent with the timing of the beginnings of 
financialization.   Moreover, the most remarkable 
feature of the data I present in support of 
financialization is not each and every gyration in 
the two time series, but rather the evidence for a 
dramatic change between the structure of the 
economy in the 1950s and 1960s and the structure 
of the economy in the post-1970s period.  Martin 
himself acknowledges this reading of the data 
when he notes that the financialization trend is 
basically continuous, but he worries that I explain a 
continuous change by referring to discrete events.  
I’m not sure I see the problem here: the discrete 
events I deal with in the book are policy changes 
that, once enacted, had durable effects on the 
structure of the American economy.  In this sense, I 
do think the historical narrative and the empirical 
evidence are telling the same story. 
 Martin also would have liked me to exploit 
comparative evidence from other national 
economies in order to make my argument more 
convincing.  While I find Martin’s examination of 
the comparative data on financialization broadly 
informative, there are a number of reasons why I 
did not undertake the kind of comparative analysis 
Martin recommends.  One is that the cases are not 
independent, limiting the usefulness of the causal 
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inferences that Martin would like to draw in 
support of my argument from the comparative 
evidence he presents.  In pursuing financialization 
at home, the United States was reorganizing global 
capital markets abroad in ways that changed the 
terms on which other economies were integrated 
into global financial markets (and here I regret not 
attending more fully to these issues, as Bill Sewell 
observes in his comment).  There is also the fact 
that firms in other countries likely emulated highly 
profitable American business practices once 
financialization was underway in the United States.  
Thus, the presence of financialization in other 
countries need not reflect the same underlying 
political economy that created conditions 
conducive to financialization in the U.S. case.   
 An even more fundamental reason that I did not 
undertake this sort of comparative analysis, to 
reiterate what I’ve said earlier, is that my interest is 
less in providing a tight explanatory account of 
financialization than it is in understanding how the 
turn to finance can be understood in light of 
domestic politics around distribution in the United 
States in the decades since the 1970s.  For this, 
comparative evidence would be illuminating, but it 
would involve not a quick and dirty configuration 
of cases to test variables, but rather detailed (and 
admittedly old fashioned pace Sewell) historical 
investigations of the actions of key policymakers 
and how these actions intersected with domestic 
political developments.  Such investigations I 
suspect would confirm Frank Dobbin’s hypothesis 
that the particular response I describe to the crisis 
of the 1970s was a uniquely American one, 
although I have not myself delved into the relevant 
empirical materials to be able to assert this 
definitively.  On this score, I can only plead 
exhaustion and hope that other scholars have more 
stamina than I! 
 This brings me to Bill Sewell’s comments.  
Sewell observes, perceptively, that financial 
innovation is a perennial feature of capitalist 
economies and wonders why financial innovation 
doesn’t get more explicit theoretical attention as a 
“driver” of financialization in my account.  Sewell 
is correct that financial entrepreneurs are 
continually innovating around regulations, and this 
is indeed part of my narrative.  The reason 
financial innovation remains undertheorized in my 
account is that to me the important question is not 
whether innovation occurs—as Sewell observes, it 
is a constant—but when and why regulators give 
up the game, allowing the innovation rather than 
bringing errant innovators back under the umbrella 
of regulation.  Stated somewhat more pointedly, 
the critical issue from my perspective is how the 
inflation of the 1970s—a response to unresolved 
distributional conflict in our society—made reining 
in financial innovations occurring during that 
decade politically unpalatable to regulators.  That 
said, I do wish I had paid greater attention to one 
innovation in particular in my account—the 
development of securitization, which in hindsight 
assumes greater importance than my limited 
attention to it suggested.  I will say that I am 
confident that had securitization been more central 
in my narrative, my overall argument would have 
only been strengthened.  In this regard, Sarah 
Quinn’s (2010) carefully researched account of the 
history of mortgage securitization is congruent 
with my argument, showing how securitization 
emerged out of the convoluted budget politics of 
the Vietnam War, allowing the state to sidestep 
difficult political choices in the context of a new 
era of austerity. 
 Sewell also wonders whether I am too quick to 
dismiss the role of finance capitalists if not in 
originating the policies I discuss than in reinforcing 
them once they were in place.  Perhaps.  But I think 
accounts of the rise of finance have often erred in 
the other direction by overstating the power of the 
financial sector.  This is easy to do if one is looking 
at the size of campaign contributions coming from 
Wall Street, which are truly staggering.  But what 
these analyses sometimes overlook is the internal 
differentiation of the financial sector.  The 
financial sector is not monolithic and internal 
opposition between various sectors of the industry 
has in many instances undercut the ability of the 
financial sector to act as a coherent political actor.  
Take the repeal of the Glass Steagall legislation 
separating investment and commercial banking as 
an example.  Repeal of Glass Steagall took over 
thirty years to accomplish—not because the 
financial sector did not devote an enormous 
amount of money to reforming banking 
legislation—but because investment banks and 
commercial banks, among other players in the 
industry, could not agree amongst themselves first 
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as to whether repeal should occur and then how 
repeal should be implemented.     
 My point here is not to deny that finance 
capitalists exert a great deal of influence over 
politics—I believe that they do, and their influence 
has almost certainly grown in the wake of the 
repeal of Glass Steagall.  My purpose in writing the 
book as I did was to write about aspects of 
financialization that aren’t captured very well from 
a narrow interest-based account.  State actors had 
reasons for pursuing policies that created an 
environment conducive to financialization that had 
little to do with pleasing financial executives and 
everything to do with navigating the tension 
between maintaining democratic legitimacy and 
meeting market imperatives.  Generally, 
policymakers have managed these tensions by 
“pulling forward future resources into present 
consumption,”4 whether through inflation, the turn 
to finance, or other kinds of “sequential 
displacements,” to borrow the term Wolfgang 
Streeck (2011) uses in his recent article in the New 
Left Review.  But all such maneuvers are inherently 
self-limiting as they do not resolve the underlying 
distributional conflicts that give rise to these 
moves.   
 And so we find ourselves at the current 
moment confronting a crisis that is perhaps more 
daunting in its political than in its economic 
dimensions—as the spread of the crisis from the 
American mortgage market to Europe’s sovereign 
debt markets makes abundantly clear.  What to do, 
Sewell asks?  The solution to our current 
difficulties, Sewell implies, must be constructed at 
the global as well as the national level, and I agree.  
Without a reconstructed international financial 
architecture that subjects international capital flows 
to some controls, there is no limit to the size of 
global imbalances that can build up in the system, 
fueling credit expansions and contractions that 
whipsaw national economies.  But I would add to 
this that there is no technical fix, no matter how 
well conceived, to the underlying problems that led 
us to financialization.  In this sense, an adequate 
response to our current quagmire requires attention 
to the normative underpinnings of market society.  
In particular, we must answer questions about who 
ultimately will pay the price of restoring weakened 
                     
4
 Streeck (2011), p. 12. 
economies back to health, and then questions about 
who gets what in societies that must live within 
more finite resource constraints than has been the 
case in the recent past.  If there is a broad lesson 
here, it is that when markets substitute for politics, 
we are in trouble.    
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Editors’ note: James Mahoney’s Colonialism and 
Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge 2010) was 
the subject of an Author Meets Critics session at 
the Social Science History Association meeting in 
Boston in November 2011. These are the revised 
comments from Mara Loveman, Nitsan Chorev, 
Richard Lachmann, and Dan Slater with Jim 
Mahoney’s response. We would like to thank 
Richard Lachmann for organizing and guest-
editing the symposium. 
 
 
Colonialism and Postcolonial 
Development: Spanish America in 
Comparative Perspective 
by James Mahoney  
(Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
 
 
Comments by Mara Loveman 
University of Wisconsin – Madison 
 
In his advance praise for Colonialism and 
Postcolonial Development, Timothy Wickham-
Crowley calls it an “epic of a book.”  Knowing Jim 
Mahoney and his previous work, I won’t say I was 
surprised to see this verdict. But it did have the 
effect of setting my expectations at the outset pretty 
darn high. 
This is an extraordinarily ambitious book. It 
tackles a huge and fundamental question: Why are 
some former colonies so much better off today than 
others? Or put another way: What explains relative 
levels of development among post-colonial 
countries? The book aspires to nothing less than 
developing a general theoretical answer to this 
question that applies broadly across all cases, while 
also generating sufficient causal explanations for 
the particular outcomes of individual cases. The 
book treats no fewer than 15 countries – all the 
nation-states that emerged from former Spanish 
colonies in the Americas – minus Panama, Cuba, 
and the Dominican Republic – plus, as an 
extension and preliminary test of the theory, the 
British Colonies and Portuguese America. The 
sheer volume of secondary scholarship mastered 
and synthesized as a prerequisite to the systematic 
comparative-historical analysis deployed to 
develop and refine the general theory is frankly 
rather mind-boggling.  
A starting premise of the book is that to explain 
why post-colonial countries have uneven levels of 
development today requires locating the causes of 
their initial differences in levels of development 
(p.8). The focus on initial differences is warranted 
for the Latin American cases, the book argues, 
because relative levels of development around the 
time of independence have been extraordinarily 
persistent ever since.  
To identify the original sources of uneven 
development in Latin America, the book tackles 
two primary explanatory tasks: First, it seeks to 
identify the factors that explain variation in levels 
of colonial settlement. Second, it seeks to identify 
the factors that explain variation in postcolonial 
levels of social and economic development.  
In very broad strokes, the explanation for 
differing levels of colonialism rejects theories that 
focus only on geographic or demographic 
characteristics of the colony, on the one hand, or 
only on the characteristics of the colonizing power, 
on the other. Instead, the theory focuses on the 
institutional “fit” between the colonial power and 
the attributes and institutions of the colonized 
territory. The explanation for variation in post-
colonial levels of economic and social 
development, in turn, focuses on the interaction 
between the prior level of colonialism and the 
political economy of the colonizing power. 
Through fine-grained comparative and historical 
analysis, these basic arguments are fleshed out to 
identify necessary and sufficient conditions for 
different levels of colonialism under different types 
of colonial powers, and for different consequences 
of level of colonialism for subsequent trajectories 
of development.  
The theoretical argument advanced in the book 
also triggers a rethinking of the historiography of 
the individual cases. As just one example of this: 
the analysis of the Argentine case fundamentally 
revises the standard chronology of Argentine 
economic and social history, locating the moment 
of Argentina’s economic takeoff relative to rest of 
Book Symposium (Mahoney) 
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the region in late colonial period rather than later in 
19
th
 century (129). This is quite a significant 
challenge to the received wisdom about the 
economic history of Argentina. Yet in the text this 
is noted more or less in passing; the novel insight 
is ‘tucked in’ along the way to development of the 
general theoretical argument. The stated goal of the 
book is to develop and test a general theory, not to 
reassess the historiographies of fifteen countries.  
But such historical insights should be highlighted 
as a major contribution of the book nonetheless. 
There are a fair number of these intriguing and 
provocative historiographic nuggets nestled into 
the narrative. (It’s almost as if they were 
deliberately planted there for others to come by and 
pick them up later, to follow wherever they may 
lead.) At times the truncation of the historical 
narratives leaves the reader with curiosities 
unsatisfied. But the omission 
of much historical detail is 
clearly not an oversight; it’s a 
sign of the author’s 
remarkable restraint. 
This restraint was of 
course critical to the task of 
developing a general theory 
of the relationship between 
colonialism and post-colonial 
development. Even readers who are wary of the 
very term ‘general theory’ will be compelled to 
acknowledge that the argument is masterfully 
crafted and difficult to refute. The analysis is clear, 
parsimonious and compelling. The pieces of the 
puzzle all fit neatly together (though maybe just a 
bit too neatly, which is an issue I’ll return to 
momentarily). Counterarguments are identified and 
addressed. The story is very much path 
determinant, yet there is room for some historical 
contingency, especially for a subset of 
“underdetermined” cases. This is major 
contribution that changes how we think about the 
relationship between colonialism and long-run 
social and economic development.  
And yet, some nagging questions remain.  
I suspect these are things that Jim has already 
thought of and thought through in the process of 
writing this book. In which case, I’m interested to 
hear how and why he chose to deal with each of 
these issues in the way that he did.  
 
1. Does the theory hold up if you take regions or 
provinces as cases instead of nation-states? The 
units of analysis in the models are the countries 
that came into existence as such after independence 
(with some borders determined later). Each country 
is coded as ‘core’, ‘semiperiphery’ or ‘periphery’. 
Yet within each country, as recognized in the 
narrative, you can also identify ‘core’, 
‘semiperiphery’ and periphery.’ Indeed, this is 
done for the case of Brazil, and in a preliminary 
way for the case of Guayaquil in Ecuador. It seems 
like the general model of the relationship between 
level of colonial settlement and post-colonial 
development should hold for units smaller than 
countries. Indeed, wouldn’t this be a more rigorous 
test of the theory than extending it to other 
empires? Or if not necessarily more rigorous, still a 
very useful test that could help tease apart the 
institutionalist-materialist 
causal factors from the 
geopolitical ones? Was the 
decision to stick with countries 
as units of analysis purely a 
pragmatic decision, driven by 
the types of data available? Or 
was the decision also 
theoretically driven? Does the 
nation-stateness of the cases 
matter for how we understand the links between 
colonialism and post-colonial development? Put 
slightly differently, does it matter for the theory 
that the boundaries delineating the units of analysis 
are not just geographic/territorial boundaries, but 
political boundaries and political boundaries of a 
very specific – national – kind. 
 
2. A related question is whether the theory 
presumes or requires us to treat the cases as 
independent. Is it possible that the relationship 
between cases at a given moment in time is itself a 
‘factor’ that gets set early on, and then contributes 
to the stability of the relative positioning of cases 
thereafter? If we made the relations between pairs 
or triads of countries themselves the units of 
analysis, how might the story change? Further, how 
does the current model equip us to consider the 
relationships between the cases and other 
significant actors that are not currently an explicit 
part of the theory – like the interventionist U.S., 
which played a much more direct role in shaping 
“Even readers who are wary of 
the very term ‘general theory’ 
will be compelled to 
acknowledge that the argument 
is masterfully crafted and diffi-
cult to refute.” 
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development possibilities and cutting off possible 
alternative trajectories in some countries than in 
others.  
 
3. What is the role of ethnicity or race in the 
general theory? In the first stage of the argument, 
ethnicity is construed primarily as a demographic 
matter – e.g., a large number of indigenous people 
in country X at a given moment favors the 
development of labor-intensive extractive 
industries relative to more sparsely settled regions. 
The size of precolonial indigenous populations 
matters because of what it reveals about relative 
levels of precolonial institutional development and 
prospective “fit” with institutions imposed by 
colonizers. In the second part of the argument, the 
significance of ethnicity for the theory seems not so 
much demographic as cultural: it is the cultural 
gulf between European-descendent populations and 
indigenous or African-descendent populations (or 
more directly, the racist disdain of most of the 
former towards the latter) that puts the brakes on 
any momentum to extend social development 
benefits beyond elite sectors of the population. Of 
course, it’s possible for race/ethnicity to play a role 
in the argument as both a demographic and cultural 
factor without contradiction. But the different ways 
of construing the significance of ethnicity for the 
general theory are never explicitly laid out as such. 
I’d like to better understand how Jim thinks about 
the relevance of racial or ethnic distinctions in the 
Americas for his general theoretical argument. Is it 
the demography of race/ethnicity that matters as a 
factor in the explanation of variation in long-run 
outcomes? Or is it the social organization of 
culturally different populations, and/or the 
prevailing ideologies of race, that determine the 
material significance of demographic conditions 
for long-term development? What are the 
underlying processes or mechanisms through 
which racial or ethnic differences – or beliefs about 
such differences – play a role in the causal 
argument? 
 
4. At the end of the day, who are the agents in this 
story? One of the things I really like about the 
argument and approach is how collective actors are 
conceived. I appreciate the historical institutionalist 
approach to thinking about who the collective 
actors are in this story and where they come from: 
“a historically grounded institutional theory of 
colonialism and development needs to examine 
how specific institutions and institutional 
complexes put whole groups of individuals in 
similar positions vis à vis the flow of resources. 
From these common positions, collective actors are 
born. These actors may then become critical forces 
in shaping productive activity and development 
outcomes, even long after the demise of the 
original institutions from which they were first 
assembled” (p.20). The key actors in the model and 
their interests do not pre-exist the institutions and 
social relationships that constitute them. Collective 
actors and their interests are constituted by the 
institutional environment. Thus it becomes critical 
to pay attention to the political economies of 
colonizing powers at the time a given territory is 
colonized, because this will decide the kinds of 
institutions implanted in the colonies (p.23). And 
critically, the institutions in place – including the 
rules of the game – will in turn shape the collective 
actors whose orientations and behaviors determine 
not only the short run prospects but also, Jim 
argues, the long-run fate of the colonies.  
The pivotal collective actors in the model turn 
out to be the merchants: it makes all the difference 
for long-run development whether the institutional 
environment at the time of colonization constitutes 
and supports entrepreneurial, free-market 
merchants (liberal colonizers) or monopolistic, 
resource hoarding merchants (mercantilist 
colonizers). I sometimes thought this 
institutionalist understanding of collective actors 
wasn’t taken far enough. In the model, the 
character of the merchants – liberal or mercantilist 
– is determined by the character of the colonizing 
power at the time. This keeps things neat – there 
are two basic kinds of merchants. But the reality 
was likely more messy: the interaction of the 
colonizing power’s political economy and existing 
colonial institutions would no doubt yield a 
continuum of hybrid liberal-mercantilist 
merchants, with varied ties to other elite actors like 
government office holders, religious authorities, 
and landed elites, generating competing and 
sometimes contradictory interests. The 
dichotomous characterization of the key collective 
actors in the model does not really seem to suffice.  
A second way in which I would have liked the 
institutionalist conceptualizations of collective 
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actors to go further is in the treatment of the 
‘subordinate’ collective actors: indigenous peoples, 
and in some cases African-descendents. Jim writes: 
“The institutional creation of subordinate and elite 
actors ... is relevant because these were the 
collective forces who shaped development 
outcomes later in the colonial period” (54). The 
exploitative relations with colonizers is understood 
to constitute indigenous communities as collective 
actors. In contrast to the developmental or 
obstructionist merchants, however, the 
subordinated collective actors, once constituted, do 
not end up doing much ‘acting’ in the model. They 
feature more prominently as ‘givens’ at different 
stages in the causal story. Though there are a few 
exceptions, for the most part, they are conceived as 
one of the factors that constrain or enable the 
initiatives of the dominant collective actors. 
Treating these groups as true collective actors 
would entail incorporating consideration of their 
interests, motives, and outlooks alongside those of 
the history-making merchants. This could include a 
more rigorous consideration of how the interests of 
dominant and subordinate collective actors were 
constituted, at least in part, through interaction or 
negotiation or conflict with each other. In sum, a 
more robustly relational conceptualization of 
collective actors seems a natural and productive 
extension of the institutionalist perspective adopted 
for the analysis. Such an extension could provide 
more leverage to explain variation in levels of 
social development across countries with large 
indigenous populations post-independence. Such 
an extension might also contribute to developing a 
more satisfying explanation of the ultimate 
trajectory of ‘underdetermined’ cases, like Chile, 
Paraguay and Costa Rica. (The current factor 
highlighted as pivotal in those cases – war – seems 
rather ad hoc and insufficient to hold the weight of 
the argument in that portion of the account). 
Again, I suspect Jim has already pondered these 
issues and made deliberate choices in resolving 
them. So I raise these questions largely out of 
genuine interest to learn how he thought about 
these and related decisions in the process of writing 
the book. To craft such a powerful, parsimonious 
and compelling argument out of the chaotic mess 
of historical reality for fifteen countries over 
hundreds of years necessarily means many paths 
were left untaken. I’d like to hear Jim discuss some 
of the decisions he made as he waded through the 
massive historiography – how he decided what was 
foreground and what background, and what could 
be left out of view altogether. Were there indeed 
paths not taken? Were there others you traveled 
down for awhile only to retreat part way (and at 
what cost)? 
I’ll finish by quoting an opening line from the 
preface of the book: “Comparative-historical 
analysis achieves its potential when it generates 
new theoretical insights of broad utility and novel 
understandings of particular cases.”  Jim has shown 
us by example what it looks like when this 
potential is fully realized. It is an extraordinary 
accomplishment. Colonialism and Postcolonial 
Development is indeed an epic of a book. 
 
 
Comments by Nitsan Chorev 
Brown University 
 
In Colonialism and Postcolonial Development, Jim 
Mahoney has generated an impressive and novel 
theory regarding the impact of colonial legacies on 
countries’ levels of development. This is a general 
theory, but drawing on a plethora of evidence 
provided by 15 case studies of Spanish colonialism 
in Latin America, the argument is remarkably 
sensitive to variation, including the identification 
of distinct paths of development.  
Given the complexity of the theory developed 
in this beautifully crafted book, this review simply 
identifies the five central arguments and responds 
to each of them individually.  
First, the type of the colonizing state matters 
for the prospect of future development. Mahoney 
argues that different colonial states established 
different types of institutions, which had a long-
term effect on the territories’ subsequent economic 
and social development. Concretely, he 
differentiates between mercantilist colonialists 
(like Portugal) and liberal colonialists (like 
Britain). The type of colonialism practiced by the 
same state could also change over time. Crucial for 
Mahoney’s analysis, Spain was mercantilist under 
the Habsburg monarchy, until 1700, but turned 
liberal under the Bourbons.  
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Whether a society was colonized by a 
mercantilist or a liberal colonial power mattered 
greatly because, according to Mahoney, 
mercantilist institutions inhibited development 
while liberal institutions encouraged development. 
Mahoney explains that this was not due to the 
institutions per se as much as it was due to the 
power configurations and elite compositions they 
created. Mercantilist institutions established 
merchant and landed elites with vested interests 
that were in conflict with policies that would 
encourage development. Liberal institutions, in 
contrast, created commercial business elites with 
vested interests that, on the 
contrary, supported the 
needed policies.   
Here, Mahoney rightly 
emphasizes the constitutive 
role of institutions in 
making elites and he then 
assigns the responsibility of 
historical change to those 
actors rather than the 
institutions that have created 
them. This “bringing the 
actors back in” approach is an important 
contribution to institutionalist analysis. Historical 
institutionalists argue that institutions make elites; 
Mahoney adds the significant insight that it 
requires labor for those elites to maintain their 
position. This argument could have been further 
enriched if Mahoney also analyzed the political and 
economic strategies that enabled the elites to 
maintain their power over decades, even as old 
institutions deteriorated and were replaced with 
new ones. Especially in conditions of failed 
development, what allowed merchant and landed 
elites to maintain their domination and not be 
replaced with (or, in other cases, become) a 
commercial elite? 
Mahoney’s second argument is that colonizers 
did not pay equal attention to all territories when 
they established these institutions. Institution 
building was more intense in some places but less 
intense in others. As a result, colonized societies 
can be differentiated based on whether they were at 
the center, semi-periphery or periphery of the 
colonizing project. 
What factors affected the level of colonialism 
of a given territory, namely, whether it was part of 
the center, semi-periphery, or periphery? Mahoney 
shows that one necessary condition for developing 
institutions at the core was existing institutional 
conditions. Mercantilist colonizers preferred 
territories with highly differentiated institutions, 
which made it easier for them to collect tribute and 
to exploit available labor for resource extraction. 
Liberal colonizers, in contrast, preferred territories 
with sparse population and proximity to ports.  
The suggestion that the level of colonialism 
depended on the institutional conditions in place is 
an important contribution to the analysis of 
colonial expansion and to economic expansion 
more generally. There is an 
understandable tendency in 
the literature to focus either 
on the characteristics of the 
external powers (e.g., 
Spanish vs. British 
colonizers, American vs. 
British empires, Chinese vs. 
Indian foreign direct 
investment and so on) or on 
the characteristics of the 
affected societies (e.g., 
geographical conditions, mineral wealth, or size of 
the population). The interplay between the two 
dimensions is a particularly fruitful analytical 
strategy that may resolve many questions regarding 
diversity in the types of intervention and, as 
Mahoney suggests, diversity in the outcomes of 
interventions as well.  
Given the theoretical potential of such an 
approach, it is possible that Mahoney’s analysis 
does not go far enough.  While referring to the 
“interplay” between the interests of the external 
powers and the local conditions in place, the 
analysis provides little attention to the impact of 
institutional and other original conditions once the 
level of colonialism is established. The narrative 
offers, then, less a genuine analysis of an 
interaction and more an identification of mediating 
factors that influenced the decisions of colonizers. 
As soon as colonizers decided on a level of interest 
in a given place, the colonized societies more or 
less disappear from the analysis. But it seems likely 
that the conditions in place have continued to play 
an independent role in the development trajectory 
of a territory even after the new institutions were 
put in place. (Mahoney suggests as much in his 
“Mahoney rightly emphasizes the 
constitutive role of institutions in 
making elites and he then assigns 
the responsibility of historical 
change to those actors rather than 
the institutions that have created 
them.” 
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analysis of social development, but not in his 
analysis of economic development, as I discuss 
below). 
According to the third argument, because not 
all colonized societies experienced the same level 
of institution building, the negative or positive 
effects on economic development – themselves 
based on whether colonial institutions were 
mercantilist or liberal – were not experienced to the 
same extent by all societies. Because mercantilist 
institutions had negative effects on economic 
development, high levels of colonialism in the core 
territories resulted in low levels of development. In 
contrast, low levels of mercantilist colonialism in 
the periphery kept the possibility of development 
open. In turn, because liberal institutions had 
positive effects on economic development, high 
levels of colonialism resulted in high levels of 
development. Low levels of liberal colonialism did 
not have the same development outcomes.  
This is a beautifully crafted argument. 
However, while Mahoney presents it as useful for 
explaining the trajectory of all colonized societies, 
independently of whether they experienced low or 
high levels of colonialism, it necessarily works 
better as an explanation for cases of high levels of 
colonialism than for cases of low levels of 
colonialism. In cases of intense colonialism, the 
institutions that were put in place by the colonizers 
created the elites that later determined the 
trajectory of development. In cases of low levels of 
colonialism, however, no such institutions were 
established, and the possibility for development 
could not be determined by the colonial legacies 
but was rather left open.  
This explanatory imbalance is partly disguised 
by the fact that Spanish colonialism offers a hybrid 
type of colonialism, starting with mercantilist 
institutions and then layering, on top of that, liberal 
institutions. This means that the fate of some of the 
colonized societies with low mercantilist 
institutions was determined by the fact that liberal 
institutions were later established. It is only in 
cases in which neither mercantilist nor liberal 
institutions were established that the possibility of 
contingency is explicitly revealed. More generally, 
the hybrid nature of Spanish colonialism means 
that we cannot really find the possible outcomes of 
“pure” Spanish cases. (The last empirical chapter, 
on Portuguese and British colonies, partly 
compensates for that).  
In turn, Mahoney concludes that the presence 
or absence of wars best explains the trajectory of 
development in the “contingent” Spanish cases – 
namely, cases in which colonized societies had low 
levels of both mercantilist and liberal institutions. 
There’s a surprising theoretical disconnect between 
the path-dependent and institutionalist emphases of 
the overall argument and the treatment of wars as 
an exogenous force. The theoretical framing is 
already complex, but I still wish that Mahoney 
incorporated into it a view on the origins of these 
wars, particularly the role of precolonial and 
colonial legacies – including institutions and elites.  
The fourth argument moves from asking about 
the institutional origins of economic development 
to the institutional origins of social development. 
The analytical distinction between the two types of 
development as potentially independent of each 
other is important. I was left with some questions, 
however, regarding the empirical conclusions. 
According to Mahoney, social development 
depends not just on the level of economic 
development achieved, but also on the size of the 
indigenous population. The sparser the indigenous 
population, the higher the level of social 
development. This argument raises two questions. 
First, since the size of the population also plays an 
important role in Mahoney’s explanation of 
economic development, it may undermine his 
attempt to offer an independent explanation to the 
origins of social development. According to 
Mahoney, the size of the indigenous population 
had a positive effect on the level of mercantilist 
colonialism, but a negative effect on the level of 
liberal colonialism. Hence, sparse indigenous 
populations led both to more economic 
development and to more social development even 
if different mechanisms were involved. Moreover, 
the direct role that Mahoney assigns to the size of 
population in explaining social development raises 
the question of whether it is entirely justified to 
limit this “size of population” factor in explaining 
economic development to its impact on the type of 
institutions in place. The second question raised by 
the argument on social development concerns the 
actors identified as contributing to economic and to 
social development, and therefore the mechanisms 
linking colonialism to later outcomes. According to 
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Mahoney’s account, elite interests explain 
economic development, while the indigenous 
population and the presence of ethnic conflicts 
serve to explain social development. From a 
political-economic perspective it seems likely that 
elite interests would have an impact on social 
development and that the size of the indigenous 
population, and certainly the presence of ethnic 
conflicts, would affect economic development.  
Finally, according to the fifth argument, the 
long-term implications of colonial institutions are 
remarkably enduring. According to Mahoney, the 
only factors that could lead to change in a 
country’s relative level of economic development 
are “ruptures” such as civil wars, revolutions, and, 
at least in the case of Venezuela, the discovery of 
oil. As I mentioned earlier, Mahoney does not 
suggest that the endurance of the outcome is due to 
the endurance of the institutions that made them 
happen. The institutions in place have certainly 
changed. Rather, it is the due to the capacity of the 
elites to maintain their privileged position in the 
economy. However, this “path-dependent 
determinism” could be questioned. On the one 
hand, the general argument of the book suggests 
that colonial institutional arrangements lock 
countries into a particular level of relative 
development (although not absolute levels of 
development). On the other hand, as Mahoney 
suggests in the conclusion, whether certain 
institutional arrangements lead or do not lead to a 
high level of economic development depends on 
the larger global economic context. So, for 
example, mercantilism worked during one period, 
liberalism during a later period, and, following 
liberalism, state-interventionism was the 
established road for national economic success.  
This leads to a puzzle. If states manage to maintain 
their relative economic position across different 
types of “global economic contexts,” it suggests 
that states manage to move from one economic 
strategy to another. This also suggests that if the 
existing elites stayed in power, they must have 
transformed their economic strategies or otherwise 
would not have been able to maintain their relative 
position in the world economy. This seems to 
somewhat contradict the notion that the long-term 
implications and legacies are enduring; certainly it 
at least requires clarification as to what gets 
endured that permits countries to maintain their 
relative economic position but prevents them from 
changing their absolute economic position.  
These five arguments offer a remarkably rich 
way of thinking about colonial legacies as well as 
the role of exogenous factors in influencing 
countries’ economic and social development more 
generally. Maybe most importantly, the book 
suggests that scholars should look at the internal 
diversity of categories of foreign influence (not all 
colonial powers are the same, not all empires are 
the same, not all types of foreign direct investment 
are the same, etc.) and that scholars consider how 
even the same type of foreign influence may have 
different effects at the local level depending on the 
existing conditions in a given setting. These are 
important lessons, and a very good reason for 
scholars, including non Latin-Americanists, to read 
this book. 
 
 
Comments by Richard Lachmann 
University at Albany, SUNY 
 
Jim’s book is designed to explain why some former 
Spanish colonies achieved relatively high levels of 
development after independence while others did 
not. His great innovation is to show systematically 
how the complexity of precolonial institutions 
affected the nature of colonialism and hence the 
degree of development under colonialism and then 
after independence. However, this book does more. 
It traces the development of each territory 
colonized by the Spanish through four stages: the 
social institutions right before the Spanish 
conquerors arrived, the structure created in the 
first, mercantilist phase of Spanish rule, the 
somewhat altered state of colonial government 
under liberal Bourbon rule in the eighteenth 
century, and finally the post-independence social 
order. Jim’s careful reading of each country’s 
history led him to the realization that for some 
countries, most notably Chile and the countries of 
Central America, there was yet another moment of 
structural transformation caused by nineteenth 
century wars. Jim explains how war allowed Chile 
and Costa Rica to make developmental strides that 
would not have happened in the absence of war, 
although in very different ways. In the case of 
Costa Rica its insulation from wars in the rest of 
Central America allowed for the consolidation of 
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liberal government. For Chile war was both an 
economic stimulus and the way in which it added 
lands rich in nitrates to its territory. For the rest of 
Central America war brought reactionary elites to 
power that retarded economic and social 
development up the present and into the 
foreseeable future.  
For the other Spanish American countries, their 
relative positions were locked in after 
independence. Argentina’s famous decline from 
one of the richest countries in the world in 1920s to 
its current positions at well below the levels of 
even the poorest Western European countries is in 
line with the overall decline of Spanish America in 
those decades. Argentina and Uruguay remain at 
the top of the Latin American hierarchy, just where 
they were 100 years ago. Their long-ago 
trajectories as Habsburg mercantile peripheries that 
became core liberal colonies of Bourbon Spain still 
shape their continental and world positions and 
their levels of social development.  
Jim writes: “Level of colonialism is important 
in its own right as an outcome to be explained. But 
in this study, level of colonialism is also of interest 
as a cause of postcolonial development” (p. 27). I 
will leave it for others to comment on Jim’s 
analysis of postcolonial development. I will focus 
on Jim’s explanation of levels of colonialism, and 
especially on his analysis of the transition from 
mercantile to liberal colonialism.  
Mercantile colonialism established a particular 
type of polity, a system of exploitation that used 
coercive methods of labor control to extract raw 
materials (most importantly precious metals, but 
also agricultural products). The specifics of labor 
control varied depending on the social structure the 
initial conquistadors encountered. While the 
system of rule varied, the ruling colonial elite 
shared a crucial characteristic across all the 
colonies: a tight linkage, which in practice 
amounted to a fusion, of officials, clerics, 
landlords, and merchants. What varied across 
colonies was the size of the elite and how firmly 
they were able to embed themselves in the 
conquered societies. The bigger, richer, more 
settled, and more complex the precolonial society, 
the more deeply the mercantilist colonial elite was 
able to plant itself. Where the elite was spread thin, 
as in peripheral Argentina, the Bourbon crown 
found empty spaces – both geographic and 
structural – in which it could insert new liberal 
elites. However, where the mercantile elites were 
dense neither the crown in Spain nor indigenous 
peoples in America had any real openings to 
challenge them. 
Here Jim goes a long way to solving the central 
mystery of colonialism. How did a few thousand 
Europeans dominate millions of Americans, 
Africans and Asians? How could Europeans 
extract resources from and exploit labor in colonies 
with only the limited number of personnel and 
relatively weak military forces available? The usual 
answer, which others have made about British 
India and Africa, is leverage. Europeans enlisted 
local rulers to do their dirty work and for the most 
part relied on existing systems of revenue 
extraction and labor control. Jim goes well beyond 
that existing answer, which is presented either at 
such a general level that it doesn’t say much more 
than the superficial summary I just offered, or is so 
steeped in the details of a particular case that it 
can’t be used to understand variations among 
colonies. What Jim has done is find a systematic 
way to differentiate precolonial societies and use 
the differences among them along several 
dimensions to explain different Spanish and, in a 
comparative chapter, British and Portuguese 
strategies for controlling the peoples and lands of 
the colonies the Europeans conquered. In essence, 
Jim argues that differences among types of 
colonialism or among forms of imperial rule are 
made when colonizers arrive at and conquer 
indigenous peoples. They are not shaped 
beforehand by metropolitan politics and culture.  
The structures of rule created in the first 
moment of colonization mattered, as Jim shows for 
subsequent economic development, and also for 
the room imperial rulers back in the metropolitan 
capital enjoyed to restructure colonial rule. This 
matters for the transition from mercantile to liberal 
colonialism. Jim finds that the stronger the 
mercantilist rule in a colony, the more entrenched 
the elite, and the less effect Bourbon reforms had. 
Only in peripheral regions were the Bourbons able 
to create new liberal merchants elites that made 
possible rapid development, most notably in 
Argentina, which had been only barely colonized 
under the Habsburgs.  
In this way, Jim makes an important 
contribution to the long debate, among historians 
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of Spain, over how much the transition to Bourbon 
rule in the 18
th
 century mattered. That debate until 
now has been largely about Spain itself. The 
dominant view is that liberal reforms didn’t 
amount to much within Spain and therefore had 
little effect in the Americas. Jim challenges that 
view. His main argument is that liberal reforms had 
a varying effect. Where colonial elites were few 
and far between, and especially where there were 
not dense complex native polities to which they 
could connect their rule, the Bourbons back in 
Spain had room for maneuver. They could set upon 
new colonial centers, empower new corps of 
merchants, and stimulate economic development, 
as in Argentina.  
My one criticism of Jim’s analysis is that he 
gives too much weigh to Bourbon bureaucratic 
reforms. Intendants, as we see in Jim’s specific 
accounts of each colony, had widely varying 
effects. Their bureaucratic organization, 
administrative training, and relative incorruptibility 
in fact accomplished little. Spain disrupted or 
bypassed old elites less through administrative fiat 
and more by finding geographic locales where old 
elites were weak and creating opportunities for new 
elites to form. Where the old elites were tightly 
integrated, intendants and new merchants either 
withered or ended up in business as junior partners 
to the old mining-landlord-clerical- administrative 
oligarchs.  
This book explains in a more rigorous way than 
ever before why it is so difficult for lands with 
dense, advanced polities that were colonized by 
Europeans to ever escape from a peripheral 
position. Mercantilist core colonies never could 
achieve higher economic development because 
during their time under mercantilist rule, elites 
were established that could not be eliminated by 
liberal reforms. Liberalism mattered ultimately 
mainly for the former peripheries, by creating an 
opening for a new commercial elite in Argentina. 
For much of the colonial world, liberalism arrived 
too late. 
 
 
Comments by Dan Slater 
University of Chicago 
 
There are basically three kinds of books in the 
social sciences. More than 99% of them are what I 
would call, for lack of a better term, ordinary 
books. And that’s OK. These books tell us 
something new or provide new evidence about 
some domain of the social world. Luckily the 
social world is boundlessly fascinating, so a great 
many of these books make major and lasting 
contributions in their domain of interest. Even 
books that don’t last long or don’t attract much 
attention add to our stock of social knowledge as 
we navigate a complicated and tumultuous world. 
They also allow most of us to find lasting 
employment in the academy. Thank goodness we 
have so many ordinary books. 
But I want to focus my remarks today on the 
other two types of books, both of which belong in 
the less-than-1%. These are truly landmark books, 
which raise the bar for us all, which are impossible 
to ignore, and which will rest at the center of our 
bookshelves and be assigned in seminars for a very 
long time to come. In case it wasn’t already 
obvious, I would put Colonialism and Postcolonial 
Development (or CPD) in this less-than-1% 
category, without hesitation. (Not to worry, though. 
I’m not threatening to unleash an “Occupy 
Mahoney” movement. This is the kind of 1% that 
the 99% wants to emulate, not expropriate.) In a 
word, CPD is extraordinary – that is, extra-
ordinary. My colleagues in this symposium have 
been telling you at great length why. 
I plan to take a slightly different tack here, 
however. I wish to ask: what kind of extraordinary 
is CPD? In my opinion, the key dividing line 
among the tiny subset of truly extraordinary books 
lies in what they strive for. Some strive for 
greatness. Others strive for perfection. Even before 
rereading Jim’s acknowledgments, which conclude 
with an endearing confession of chronic, 
paternally-inherited perfectionism, it struck me that 
CPD is as close to a perfect book as I can recall 
reading. But I want to argue that it is closer to 
being a perfect book than it is to being a great 
book. I also want to argue, however, that – despite 
the obvious and inconvenient constraint that the 
book is already in print – it is not too late for Jim to 
make CPD a greater contribution than it already is. 
Rather than distinguishing perfection and 
greatness in the abstract, let me offer a concrete 
example. Jim’s favorite book, in fact: Skocpol’s 
States and Social Revolutions. Looking back, I 
doubt that very many of us would deny that this is 
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a great book – even one of our greatest. It offered a 
new theoretical perspective on one of the biggest 
questions of our age, or any age. It made a 
profoundly provocative argument. But it was also 
far from perfect. It ignored a lot of important 
things. It was full of holes and unanswered 
questions. People couldn’t wait to argue with it, to 
build upon it, or to tear it apart (probably in some 
cases literally). But nobody could even dream of 
ignoring it, if they wanted to talk about revolutions. 
For all its assertive and self-confident tone, States 
and Social Revolutions reads more like the first 
word in an argument than the last word. 
But the book was also stifled by a certain 
perfectionism. It tried very hard not to be wrong, or 
to cross into terrains where it might be proven 
wrong. It set very tight scope conditions around its 
arguments. Only great social revolutions, only non-
colonized agrarian empires, etc. But then 
something interesting happened. Several things, 
actually. Iran. Nicaragua. People Power. And rather 
than bunkering down behind her restrictive initial 
scope conditions, Skocpol came out to fight – and 
to play. She extended her argument into new 
empirical terrains, adjusting but never abandoning 
her state-centric theoretical approach. She smacked 
Sewell back when Sewell smacked her, but she 
also started taking ideology more seriously as a 
structural variable. This is why I find it more fun 
today to read her Social Revolutions in the Modern 
World, circa 1994, than her original book, circa 
1979. As time went on, Skocpol abandoned the 
quest for perfection, and in so doing produced a 
theoretical armature that was even closer to true 
greatness. (With a fair amount of help from the 
great Jeff Goodwin, I might add.) 
So what about Jim? What about CPD? This 
book’s perfectionism can be seen on every page in 
its impeccable analytical craftsmanship. It leaves 
no stone unturned. It modestly accepts the 
limitations of its central framework. It does not try 
to convince you that types and levels of 
colonialism neatly explain much more than half of 
Spanish America’s 15 cases. It “takes sides” at a 
metatheoretical level, in Jim’s insistence that 
institutions are distribution devices rather than 
coordination devices (p. 15). But as I will detail in 
a moment, it does not “take sides,” or even totally 
come clean on whether he thinks one should or 
should not take sides, on some of the biggest 
theoretical questions at the heart of his masterwork. 
In short, it is not the kind of book that makes 
me want to yell out: “I disagree!” As Mara 
Loveman rightly put it, “the argument is 
masterfully crafted and difficult to refute.” Indeed, 
I am literally unsure whether Jim is wrong about 
anything in CPD. Like Mary Poppins, this book is 
practically perfect in every way. Yet this 
perfectionism comes at the cost of avoiding some 
dust-ups: the kinds of dust-ups that made 
Skocpol’s work on revolutions less perfect but 
more great. As a result, there is a way in which 
CPD reads like the last word in an argument, not 
the first. 
I don’t suspect that Jim would intend such a 
thing. So in the remainder of my remarks, I would 
like to point to three areas where I would love to 
see Jim “take sides,” or tell me why we have been 
thinking about “sides” in all the wrong way. To my 
mind the main and perhaps only significant flaw in 
CPD doesn’t lie in anything Jim says, but in some 
big theoretical conversations it either elides or 
misses. In his future work on colonial legacies and 
development, I would love to see Jim do what 
Skocpol did, and help us all become more engaged 
theoretical conversation partners. 
The first two conversations relate to 
development. Development is both a process and 
an outcome, but CPD primarily treats it as an 
outcome. Ironically, the “postcolonial 
development” in Jim’s title does not refer to how 
postcolonial countries develop at all. It refers to the 
legacies of colonial development as a process on 
postcolonial levels of development as an outcome. 
This begs the question of why countries 
develop, in general. In the context of colonial Latin 
America, Jim sounds an awful lot like Douglass 
North. Property rights are the key. Liberalism is the 
answer. Recall Richard Lachmann’s big takeaway 
line, that liberalism simply came too late to most of 
the colonial world. Considering how much ink and 
even blood have been spilled over the relative 
importance of states and markets in national 
development, this claim is enormously 
consequential, if it’s indeed what Jim means to say. 
But it’s not as clear as it should be, since CPD 
ultimately embraces a kind of radical equifinality 
in which markets seem to be the key in the 17
th
 and 
18
th
 centuries, and states seem to be the key in the 
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20
th
 and 21
st
. Would even Gerschenkron draw so 
sharp of a temporal distinction? In sum, I would 
love to hear more about how Jim’s mountain of 
historical evidence might prompt us to reassess our 
theories of property rights, state intervention, and 
development – by which I mean the process of 
development. 
More could also be said about CPD’s lessons 
for theories of the rentier state and “resource 
curse.” Understandably, Jim is more concerned 
with assessing the direct role of mineral wealth in 
shaping levels of colonialism than levels of 
development. But of course there are reams of 
works (if perhaps no great works) that inquire into 
the effects of resource wealth on economic 
diversification and growth. 
This exact theme pops up 
repeatedly in Jim’s case 
studies. CPD cites some of this 
literature, as it cites North on 
property rights, and cites an 
array of scholars on 
developmental states. Yet broad citation cannot 
take the place of deep conversation. Much as Mara 
Loveman saw “nuggets nestled in the narrative” on 
particular cases, I saw a similar pattern in how Jim 
engages with these key literatures. I am ultimately 
left too unsure whether the Spanish American 
experience broadly supports, negates, or 
complicates these theories, and how. 
My third and final plea for deeper theoretical 
conversation is the one I’m most surprised I need 
to make. So, a quiz question for the reader: what 
great scholar’s “research tradition” did Jim so 
brilliantly review in his edited volume with 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer? There were several, but 
the most memorable is Barrington Moore. No one 
knows Moore better than Jim. So where is 
Barrington Moore in CPD? The case studies and 
even the theory discussion repeatedly invoke the 
distinction between commercial elites and their 
anti-commercial landed brethren. Yet I could find 
Moore nowhere in the endnotes, which number 
nearly a thousand. 
But Moore is everywhere in the text itself. 
Especially on the point where Jim is maybe most 
cautious about theorizing, on the “mechanisms of 
perpetuation” through which developmental 
legacies persist (see p. 227). By my reading, the 
key mechanism in CPD is what Jim calls 
“entrenched mercantilist actors” (50) or “powerful 
mercantilist coalitions” (118). If Moore, like Marx, 
thought bourgeois revolutions required “sweeping 
away the feudal rubbish,” Jim is arguing that 
development requires sweeping away the 
mercantilist rubbish. 
Might this be why war, revolutions, commodity 
booms, and state power all deflect developmental 
trajectories? Because they sweep away the 
mercantilist rubbish? Or to be more precise: they 
only deflect developmental trajectories when they 
sweep away the mercantilist rubbish? In this light, 
these additional factors would not be fully 
alternative explanations to Jim’s, but additional 
historical forces that unleash his core causal 
mechanism. In Nitsan 
Chorev’s terms, this would 
reduce the “analytical 
detachment” between his 
original explanation and these 
subsidiary claims. Does this 
unifying explanatory 
maneuver make sense, or go too far? I think it 
could make for a terrific debate. 
So, to conclude: Books anticipate objections 
when they are trying to be perfect; they incite 
objections when they are trying to be great. CPD 
anticipates brilliantly, but it incites insufficiently, 
at least for my taste. If Jim’s own legacy in the 
study of colonialism is to transcend the tremendous 
achievements of CPD itself – as we all must 
certainly hope and anticipate – there is still ample 
opportunity for Jim to complement his father 
Elmer’s obsession with perfection with Skocpol’s 
yearning for greatness. 
 
 
Reply to Critics 
James Mahoney 
Northwestern University 
 
Historical Explanation and Theory 
Development: Reply to Loveman, Chorev, 
Lachmann, and Slater 
 
“Comparative history grows out of the interplay of 
theory and history,” Theda Skocpol once noted, 
“and it should in turn contribute to the further 
enrichment of each.”  My work on Colonialism 
and Postcolonial Development was written with 
“Books anticipate objections 
when they are trying to be per-
fect; they incite objections when 
they are trying to be great.” 
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the goal of both enriching our general theories and 
advancing our historical understanding of 
colonialism and its long-run developmental 
legacies for particular cases.  How well I achieved 
these goals is the subject matter of the preceding 
commentaries from Mara Loveman, Nitsan 
Chorev, Richard Lachmann, and Dan Slater.  I am 
grateful to each of them for sharing their views on 
the ways in which I have – and have not – 
succeeded in advancing new theoretical agendas 
and generating valid explanations of processes of 
colonialism and postcolonial development as they 
actually occurred historically. 
 
Mara Loveman provides the kind of comments that 
an author of a book can only hope to receive.  Her 
discussion of Colonialism and Postcolonial 
Development is sophisticatedly appreciative, and 
she praises aspects of the book that I like best too. 
Loveman views the theory as “clear, parsimonious, 
and compelling,” yielding an empirical argument 
that is “difficult to refute.”  She applauds the 
aesthetics and craftsmanship of the book as well as 
its engagement with vast secondary literatures. She 
calls attention to and sees as a contribution the fact 
that the argument “triggers a rethinking of the 
historiography of the individual cases.” She is right 
that these “historiographic nuggets” were 
“deliberately planted there for others to come by 
and pick them up later, to follow wherever they 
may lead.” Bless Mara Loveman for emphasizing 
the historiographic contribution of Colonialism and 
Postcolonial Development. 
“And yet, some nagging questions remain,” 
Loveman writes in pushing me to think more 
deeply about four questions. Her first question 
concerns whether the argument holds up at 
subnational levels of analysis.  As she suggests, the 
individual case narratives make many subnational 
comparisons. These comparisons are used to 
explain important variations within countries – e.g., 
northern versus central and southern Mexico; 
coastal versus inland Ecuador; western versus 
eastern Bolivia; and interior versus littoral regions 
in Argentina. I agree with Loveman that a useful 
further test of the general theory would be to draw 
on subnational comparisons in a more systematic 
way than I did in Colonialism and Postcolonial 
Development. I chose to focus mainly on the 
country level because I believe that national states 
and the territories they claim to control have been 
the dominant political units of the international 
system. In turn, because I was so preoccupied with 
presenting the argument clearly at this national 
level of analysis, I did not to call central attention 
to my subnational findings when developing the 
theory and summarizing the empirical findings. 
Rightly or wrongly, I worried that drawing too 
much attention to the subnational comparisons 
would lead readers to lose sight of the “big 
picture,” which concerns the cross-national 
comparison. 
Loveman’s second question asks “whether the 
theory presumes or requires us to treat the cases as 
independent.” The general theory does assume the 
independence of cases. The fact that this 
independence is ultimately a fiction is one of 
several reasons why I suggest that the general 
theory is simply a starting point: it must be 
supplemented with other theoretical principles in 
the explanation of actual cases.  I see the flexibility 
built into the overall explanatory framework as one 
of its great strengths. Thus, in the case analyses, I 
always started with the general theory but then 
brought in other relevant case-specific 
considerations (including interrelationships among 
cases) as needed. I anticipated the kinds of 
additional considerations that would need to be 
incorporated with the discussion of theoretical 
principles in the first chapter. 
“What exactly is the role of ethnicity or race in 
the general theory,” Loveman wants to know with 
her third question. For example, Loveman asks for 
more discussion of what exactly it is about 
indigenous people (e.g., their culture, the racist 
ideologies to which they are subjected, their social 
organization) that links their relative size to social 
development outcomes. In my historical account, 
the fundamental causal culprit is colonial 
institutions of economic exploitation. Indeed, the 
precolonial size of the indigenous population was 
linked to levels of colonialism in the first place 
because it shaped possibilities for economic 
exploitation. From large-scale colonial exploitation 
emerged large-scale impoverished, spatially 
concentrated, and denigrated indigenous 
communities.  The extreme poverty of these 
communities was the most immediate source of 
their “contribution” to poor social outcomes at the 
national level. But that poverty was a byproduct of 
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colonial institutions, and it was reinforced through 
a host of other mechanisms, including cultural ones 
such as racism. A full account of such reinforcing 
mechanisms was far beyond what I could 
accomplish in the book. But I think the case 
narratives offer a starting point for other 
comparative researchers who want to take up this 
task. 
Finally, Loveman asks about the agency of the 
main collective actors in the argument: elite 
merchants and indigenous communities. For the 
merchants, she worries that a distinction between 
liberal and mercantilist traders is not sufficient. 
Yes, I agree that these merchants actually fell along 
a continuum. In cases where the historiography is 
especially deep, such as Peru, I was able to make 
nuanced distinctions about types of merchants. But 
for many other cases, I lacked sufficient empirical 
detail to make fine-grained points. As additional 
historical research is carried out on colonial 
merchants throughout the region, it may eventually 
become possible to do more of what Loveman 
rightly wants. With respect to the indigenous 
communities, Loveman asks why I did not say 
more about their interests, motives, and outlooks. 
My case narratives do feature some of these 
matters: the strategies used by kuracas when 
negotiating with Spanish authorities, the 
motivations of forasteros for leaving their homes, 
and various techniques of cultural preservation. 
But I had to work with the existing historiography, 
which is still disappointingly underdeveloped on 
this topic for most cases. We need studies of 
colonial indigenous communities as history makers 
and not simply history takers for a wider range of 
regions. 
 
Nitsan Chorev’s encompassing and thought 
provoking comments point to areas where I might 
have omitted important considerations or should 
have addressed certain themes at greater length. 
While Chorev appreciates my discussion of the 
institutional constitution of elite and ethnic actors 
within colonial Spanish America, she suggests that 
I should have said more about the reproduction of 
those actors once colonial institutions were 
changed or removed. I certainly see Chorev as 
setting an agenda for future research. My argument 
explored the original creation of specific types of 
elite and subordinate actors and the ways in which 
they helped bring territories to their initial levels of 
development. Yet more could and should be said in 
future analyses about the evolving institutions that 
reconstituted those actors once they were brought 
into being. 
As Chorev notes, I argue that colonialism was 
not fate for all territories in Spanish America. 
Several territories were only weakly colonized, and 
their outcomes depended on events in the decades 
that followed independence. I think that Chorev 
will agree that the general theoretical model 
anticipates these “contingent” cases rather well 
(though she may not be pleased that colonial 
history and the theory allow for such 
contingencies). The theory tells us when 
colonialism will bring countries to specific levels 
of development and when it will leave outcomes 
underdetermined and open to postcolonial 
occurrences. For the Spanish American cases in 
which outcomes were underdetermined, the book 
presents a supplementary explanation of the 
nineteenth-century events (especially warfare) that 
sorted them into different levels of development. 
With this additional layer of analysis, I try to offer 
a “complete” explanation of outcomes across all 
the cases in Spanish America. The supplementary 
explanation is indeed different from the general 
theory. But this difference tracks the historical 
record, and it must be acknowledged if one seeks 
valid explanation. 
Chorev raises other questions about the role of 
the indigenous population in shaping economic and 
social development. In my argument, the 
institutional organization of the precolonial 
population is a crucial cause of level of colonial 
institutional implantation. In turn, colonial 
institutions influence economic development 
through the constitution of specific elite actors. 
Chorev argues, however, that the size of the 
postcolonial indigenous population may have had a 
major direct effect on economic development, 
especially through ethnic conflict, independent of 
my mediator variable. Yet I find little evidence for 
this claim. The effect of the indigenous population 
on economic performance during the colonial 
period was filtered through colonial institutions 
and shaped economic development only indirectly 
via influence on elite constitution. This reality can 
be most easily appreciated by looking at peripheral 
cases such as Honduras and Paraguay, where the 
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indigenous population was small but economic 
development did not commence for want of the 
right kind of elite actors. To the extent that the 
indigenous population and ethnic cleavages had 
direct development consequences, these effects 
were manifested mainly in social developmental 
outcomes (e.g., levels of education, health). Even 
here, however, the indigenous population was not 
the sole cause of social development outcomes.  
Economic development itself – an outcome 
centrally generated by elite constitution and 
activity – also mattered in the ways formally 
summarized in the book. 
Finally, Chorev ends by asking questions about 
the endurance of relative levels of national 
development despite changing modes of global 
economic organization.  She is correct that I do not 
offer a fully developed theory of the evolving 
mechanisms that sustained relative levels of 
development across time.  My goal was 
documenting this persistence (something that had 
not been done very well) and then identifying the 
causes of the initial positioning of countries within 
the enduring hierarchy of development.  Future 
research on mechanisms of perpetuation can 
hopefully benefit from this argument and stand on 
the empirical foundation built in Colonialism and 
Postcolonial Development. 
 
Richard Lachmann’s comments address a different 
aspect of the argument:  the causes of variations in 
the extent to which Spain (and other European 
colonizers) settled and implanted institutions in 
their colonial possessions. I am grateful to him for 
focusing on this part of the argument.  For my book 
is nearly as much about the causes of variations in 
levels of colonialism as it is about the effects of 
those variations on long-run development. 
Lachmann finds much to like in my 
explanation of colonial variations, especially the 
way in which it emphasizes the interactions 
between the institutions of the precolonial society 
(i.e., level of precolonial institutional complexity) 
and the institutions of colonizing society (i.e., 
mercantilist vs. liberal) as causal determinants.  His 
central concern revolves around my treatment of 
the political reforms carried out in Spanish 
America under Bourbon rule. He writes that my 
account “gives too much weight to Bourbon 
bureaucratic reforms” in the theoretical discussion 
(though less in the actual case studies). The 
account in the book (see pp. 44-46) follows classic 
works such as Mark A. Burkholder and D. S. 
Chandler’s From Impotence to Authority: The 
Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 
1687-1808 (University of Missouri Press, 1977) 
and John Lynch’s Spanish Colonial 
Administration, 1782-1810: The Intendant System 
in the Vicroyalty of the Río de la Plata (Athlone 
Press, 1958). Any further debate with Lachmann 
would require exploring the evidentiary basis for 
his doubts about my empirical treatment. 
Ultimately, the stakes of this disagreement are not 
high, since both Lachmann and I concur that the 
Bourbon reform was crucial mainly for economic 
reasons, especially providing new opportunities for 
trade within the New World.  
Dan Slater’s entertaining but important remarks 
are built around a useful distinction between the 
validity/quality of a specific argument (i.e., degree 
of perfectionism) and the larger theoretical and 
agenda-setting implications of an argument (i.e., 
degree of greatness). On these dimensions, Slater 
argues that my book is nearly perfect but falls short 
in its greatness. Far be it from me to disagree with 
him about the level of perfectionism achieved in 
Colonialism and Postcolonial Development. 
Instead, I will focus on his remarks about the larger 
theoretical implications of the book. 
To make his points, Slater compares 
Colonialism and Postcolonial Development to 
Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions. Skocpol’s 
famous book was unusual (arguably singular) in 
the degree to which it influenced scholarly debates 
and set important intellectual agendas in the field. 
Slater is right that perceived imperfections in 
Skocpol’s work “provoked” many scholars to 
refute to her argument. He is also right that 
Skocpol’s strong stances on weighty analytic 
matters put her at the center of the theoretical 
controversies of the day.  No one could afford to 
ignore Skocpol – and no one wanted to ignore her 
either. 
Although Skocpol’s work profoundly 
influenced me, I never saw myself as writing for 
the kind of large audience in the social sciences for 
whom Skocpol’s work struck a chord of one kind 
or another. When I imagined my reader, I am not 
too ashamed to confess, I had in mind a select set 
of scholars appreciative of excellence in 
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craftsmanship and the pursuit of valid knowledge 
via macrocausal analysis.  In Slater’s terms, I had 
in mind scholars who strove for and could 
recognize perfectionism in the field of macrocausal 
analysis. I knew full well that this group was a 
minority within the social sciences. But it was the 
group who I cared about the most and to whom I 
wanted to speak most directly. And to speak to 
them in the way that I wanted, I wrote a book that 
would not and could not trigger the kind of 
reaction of States and Social Revolutions.  
My book, of course, is not without an explicit 
and extensive discussion of important theoretical 
matters. I develop and defend a 
distributional approach to 
institutions. I weigh in on key 
debates about the role of 
geographic conditions in 
promoting (or not) development. I 
take on leading theories of 
colonialism, including especially 
those that have gained influence within the 
discipline of economics. I offer a vision of stability 
in relative levels of development not present in the 
literature. I address issues concerning the historical 
evolution of the world economy as a whole and its 
influence on patterns of colonialism and 
development. Yet my goal throughout is less to 
provoke debate than to show how certain 
theoretical literatures can inform principles of 
analysis that are necessary for the valid explanation 
of the outcomes examined in my book. 
Slater would have liked me to have done even 
more, and he suggests some literatures that I might 
have engaged at greater length, such as work on 
property rights, the resource curse, and Moore’s 
famous argument about commercial elites. It is 
possible that discussing these and other theoretical 
literatures at greater length would have increased 
the market for the book (and thus its “impact”).  
But given my explanatory goals, I was not mainly 
speaking to the issues addressed in these additional 
literatures.  And utilizing them was not crucial for 
the development of the theoretical principles that 
drove my main argument (though I concede that 
Slater is probably right that I should have discussed 
Moore at greater length). In macrocausal analysis, 
one must resist the temptation of addressing issues 
and controversies that are really only tangential to 
the explanatory goals at hand. While avoiding 
these temptations may come at the expense of 
theoretical impact, it is essential if one seeks 
maximum results on Slater’s dimension of level of 
perfectionism. 
When compared to my book or any 
contemporary work of macrocausal analysis, 
Skocpol’s States and Social 
Revolutions enjoyed important 
opportunities in terms of being 
able to shape the theoretical 
landscape.  For the literatures that 
she had to engage were – by 
today’s standards, at least – “big 
but easy targets”:  intra-societal 
modernization approaches to the international 
system, pluralist and reductionist Marxist views on 
the state, and an array of simplistic, ahistorical 
theories of revolution. Skocpol chose not to engage 
directly the sophisticated comparative-historical 
arguments about revolution of the time, such as 
Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy (1966) and John Dunn’s Modern 
Revolutions (1972). She could avoid this 
engagement because these comparative-historical 
works were not the leading theoretical orientations 
in the 1970s. But I had to work – as we all have to 
work now – in a post-States and Social Revolutions 
environment in which more nuanced perspectives 
are leading orientations that cannot be ignored. 
The legitimate targets of the past are today nothing 
more than artificial straw men. 
It is possible that our generation will yield a new 
work of macrocausal analysis that matches the 
greatness of States and Social Revolutions. In the 
meantime, though, there is nothing wrong with 
settling for a perfect book.
 
 
Congratulations to Elizabeth Popp Berman (University at Albany, SUNY), whose book Creating the 
Market University: How Academic Science Became an Economic Engine was awarded the 2011 President's 
Member Award 
“The legitimate targets of 
the past are today nothing 
more than artificial straw 
men.” 
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Book Award by the Social Science History Association. “The prize rewards an especially meritorious first 
work by a beginning scholar. … Entrants will be judged on the criteria of scholarly significance, 
interdisciplinary reach, and methodological innovativeness, within the broad category of monographs 
analyzing past structures and events and change over time.” Further information can be found at: 
www.ssha.org/awards/award-winners/157-2011-presidents-book-award-winner. 
 
 
 
American Journal of Cultural Sociology 
 
Editors: 
Jeffrey C. Alexander, Department of Sociology, Yale University, USA 
Ronald N. Jacobs, Department of Sociology, University at Albany, State University of New York, USA 
Philip Smith, Department of Sociology, Yale University, USA 
 
From modernity’s onset, social theorists have been announcing the death of meaning, at the hands of market 
forces, impersonal power, scientific expertise, and the pervasive forces of rationalization and 
industrialization. Yet, cultural structures and processes have proved surprisingly resilient. Relatively 
autonomous patterns of meaning—sweeping narratives and dividing codes, redolent if elusive symbols, 
fervent demands for purity and cringing fears of pollution—continue to exert extraordinary effects on action 
and institutions. They affect structures of inequality, racism and marginality, gender and sexuality, crime and 
punishment, social movements, market success and citizen incorporation. New and old new media project 
continuous symbolic reconstructions of private and public life. 
 As contemporary sociology registered the continuing robustness of cultural power, the new discipline of 
cultural sociology was born. How should these complex cultural processes be conceptualized? What are the 
best empirical ways to study social meaning? Even as debates rage around these field-specific theoretical and 
methodological questions, a broadly cultural sensibility has spread into every arena of sociological study, 
illuminating how struggles over meaning affect the most disparate processes of contemporary social life.  
 Bringing together the best of these studies and debates, the American Journal of Cultural Sociology 
publicly crystallizes the cultural turn in contemporary sociology. By providing a common forum for the many 
voices engaged in meaning-centered social inquiry, the AJCS will facilitate communication, sharpen 
contrasts, sustain clarity, and allow for periodic condensation and synthesis of different perspectives. The 
journal aims to provide a single space where cultural sociologists can follow the latest developments and 
debates within the field. 
 We welcome high quality submissions of varied length and focus: contemporary and historical studies, 
macro and micro, institutional and symbolic, ethnographic and statistical, philosophical and methodological. 
Contemporary cultural sociology has developed from European and American roots, and today is an 
international field. The AJCS will publish rigorous, meaning-centered sociology whatever its origins and 
focus, and will distribute it around the world. 
 Our first issue will publish in the first quarter of 2013 but accepted articles will appear earlier online. 
Submissions will be anonymously reviewed. 
 For more information about AJCS, and to access our online submission system, please visit our website 
at www.palgrave-journals.com/ajcs/. 
 
 
Comparative Sociology 
 
Comparative Sociology, founded in 2001, is an international scholarly journal dedicated to advancing 
comparative sociological analysis of societies and cultures, institutions and organizations, groups and 
collectivities, networks and interactions. The journal publishes theoretical and empirical work on all aspects 
Journal Announcements and Calls for Papers 
Member Publications 
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of comparative sociology, and welcomes both quantitative and qualitative work. Comparative Sociology is 
sponsored by RC 20 (Comparative Sociology) of the International Sociological Association and published by 
Brill Academic. Articles are indexed in SCOPUS, Sociological Abstracts, and the Social Sciences Index. 
Manuscripts may be submitted through Editorial Manager at the journal's web site 
(http://www.brill.nl/comparative-sociology). For questions, contact the editor, David Weakliem (University 
of Connecticut). 
 
 
 
Berman, Elizabeth Popp. 2012. Creating the Market University: How Academic Science Became an 
Economic Engine. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Bonastia, Christopher. 2012. Southern Stalemate: Five Years without Public Education in Prince Edward 
County, Virginia. University of Chicago Press 
 
Chorev, Nitsan. 2012. The World Health Organization between North and South. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
 
Fox, Cybelle. 2012. Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the 
Progressive Era to the New Deal. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Go, Julian. 2011. Patterns of Empire: the British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Goldberg, Chad Alan. 2011. “The Jews, the Revolution, and the Old Regime in French Anti-Semitism and 
Durkheim’s Sociology.” Sociological Theory 29(4): 248-71. 
 
Gorski, Philip S., David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, eds. 2012. The 
Postsecular in Question. New York: New York University Press. 
 
Haglund, LaDawn and Rimjhim Aggarwal. 2011. “Test of Our Progress: The Translation of Economic and 
Social Rights Norms into Practices.” Journal of Human Rights 10: 1-27. 
 
Halfmann, Drew. 2011. Doctors and Demonstrators: How Political Institutions Shape Abortion Law in the 
United States, Britain and Canada. University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hough, Phillip A. 2011. “Disarticulations and Commodity Chains: Cattle, Coca and Capital Accumulation 
along Colombia’s Agricultural Frontier.” Environment and Planning A 43(5): 1016-1034. 
 
Hough, Phillip A. 2011. “Guerrilla Insurgency as Organized Crime: Explaining the So-Called ‘Political 
Involution’ of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” Politics and Society 39(3): 379-414. 
 
Hough, Phillip A. and Jennifer Bair. 2012. “Dispossession, Class Formation and the Political Imaginary of 
Colombia’s Coffee Producers over the Longue Durée: Beyond the Polanyian Analytic.” Journal of World-
Systems Research 18(1): 30-49. 
 
Lamont, Michèle and Nissim Mizrachi, eds. 2012. “Special Issue: Responses to Stigmatization in 
Comparative Perspectives: Brazil, Canada, Israel, France, South Africa, Sweden and The United States.” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 35(3). 
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Reed, Isaac Ariail. 2012. “Analytical Sociology: Appreciation and Ambivalence.” Sociologica 1/2012. 
 
Rhomberg, Chris. 2012. The Broken Table: The Detroit Newspaper Strike and the State of American Labor. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Tuğal, Cihan. 2012. “Fight or Acquiesce? Religion and Political Process in Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
Neoliberalizations.” Development and Change 43(1): 23-51. 
 
Woodberry, Robert D. 2012. “The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy.” American Political Science 
Review 106(2): 244-274. 
 
 
 
Theda Skocpol Best Dissertation Award for 2012 
 
Winner 
 
Stephan Bargheer, Max Planck Institute-Berlin 
“Moral Entanglements: The Emergence and Transformation of Bird Conservation in Great Britain and 
Germany, 1790-2010.” 
 
Runner-up 
 
Damon Maryl, University of California, Berkeley 
“Secular Conversions: Politics, Institutions, and Religious Education in the United States and Australia, 
1800-2000.” 
 
 
Bendix Prize for Best Student Paper Award 
 
Co-winners 
 
Carly Knight, Harvard University. “A Voice but Not a Vote: The Case of Surrogate Representation and 
Social Welfare For Legal Noncitizens Since 1996.” 
 
And 
 
Diana Rodriguez-Franco, Northwestern University. “Internal Wars, Taxation, and State Building.” 
 
 
Barrington Moore Best Book Award 
 
Winner 
 
Yang Su, University of California, Irvine. 2011. Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural 
Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
Section Awards 
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Honorable Mentions 
 
Gail Kligman, UCLA and Katherine Verdery, Graduate Center–CUNY. 2011. Peasants under Siege: The 
Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
And 
 
James Mahoney, Northwestern University. 2010. Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish 
America in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
Charles Tilly Best Paper Award 
 
Winner 
 
Nicolas Hoover Wilson, University of California, Berkeley. 2011. “From Reflection to Refraction: State 
Administration in British India, circa 1770-1855.” American Journal of Sociology 116 (5): 1437-77. 
 
Honorable Mention 
 
Hazem Kandil, UCLA. 2011. “Islamizing Egypt? Testing the Limits of Gramscian Counterhegemonic 
Strategies.” Theory and Society 40(1): 37-62. 
 
 
Please join us at the reception at the ASA Meeting in Denver on Friday, August 17 with the Section on 
Global and Transnational Sociology from 6:30-8:00 where we will give out the awards. Congratulations to 
the winners! Many thanks also to our Committee Members who had hard decisions to make. 
 
 
 
 
Council Chair-Elect 2012 
 
Andreas Wimmer, UCLA 
 
Council Members – 3 Year term begins in 2012 
 
Emily Erikson, Yale University 
Isaac Reed, University of Colorado at Boulder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section Election Results 
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Sinem Adar 
Brown University 
 
Understanding Nation-State Formation and Its Everyday Exclusionary Implications on Non-Muslims in 
Istanbul and Alexandria, 1920-early 1970s 
 
My dissertation explores a seeming puzzle in the integration of non-Muslims to Turkish and Egyptian nation-
states. In Turkey, an adamantly secular nation-state, non-Muslim minorities decreased from about 20% to 
0.1% of the population, while in officially religious Egypt, they (most of whom are Coptic Christians) still 
account for almost 15% of the population. What is it about these two trajectories that brings together 
secularism and almost complete religious homogeneity in one case (Turkey), and official religious ideology 
with so much more diversity in the other (Egypt)? What are the implications of these different trajectories on 
the legal and social integration of non-Muslims in two post-Ottoman port cities, Istanbul (Turkey) and 
Alexandria (Egypt), between 1920s-1970s? Building on historical ethnographic data of a 15-month period of 
fieldwork in these cities, my dissertation demonstrates that strong state consolidation in Turkey during the 
first two decades of the republic under a strenuous nationalist regime of assimilation ensured the legal 
integration of non-Muslims. However, under increasing popular nationalist pressure, the social integration of 
non-Muslims became difficult, and as a result many left Istanbul starting from the late 1950s-early 1960s. In 
Egypt, on the other hand, increasing popular nationalist mobilization as a reaction to the British indirect 
colonial rule (between 1920s and the late 1940s) led to extensive state consolidation in the aftermath of the 
1952 coup d’état. It is in this context that legal and social integration of non-Muslims (except Coptic 
Christians) in Alexandria became more and more difficult starting from the 1940s, leading to their gradual 
emigration from the city.  
 
Dissertation Committee: Gianpaolo Baiocchi (Chair), John Logan, Patrick Heller, Karen Barkey (Columbia 
University) 
 
Research Interests: Comparative Historical Sociology, Political Sociology, Urban Sociology, Nationalism, 
Nation-state Formation, Category- and Boundary-making, Politicization of Religion, Race and Ethnicity, 
Citizenship, Urban citizenship, Civil Society, Social Movements, Democratization, Welfare State and Social 
policy, Historical Research Methods (particularly Historical Ethnography), Middle East and the Balkans, 
Turkey, Egypt 
 
E-mail: sinem_adar@brown.edu 
 
 
 
Andrew Dawson 
McGill University 
 
State Authority Structures and the Rule of Law in Post-Colonial Societies: A Comparison of Jamaica and 
Barbados 
 
My dissertation examines the social determinants of the rule of law by comparing Jamaica and Barbados, two 
countries with many similarities, but with divergent outcomes concerning the rule of law.  The research takes 
a comparative historical approach, specifically investigating the origins of the divergence of the rule of law 
between Jamaica and Barbados by focusing on the late colonial period (1937-1966).  Using new data 
collected from archival research, state legitimacy is identified as the key factor that helps explain the 
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divergent trajectories of the rule of law in Jamaica and Barbados post-independence.  Going beyond state-
based explanations of the rule of law, the analysis suggests that the rule of law not only depends on 
characteristics of the state, but also on characteristics of society and the fit between the two. 
 
Dissertation Committee: Matthew Lange (Chair), John A. Hall, Axel van den Berg 
 
Research Interests:  Political Sociology, Sociology of Development, Political and Ethnic Violence, and 
Comparative Historical Sociology. 
 
E-mail: andrew.dawson@umontreal.ca 
 
 
 
Cristián Doña–Reveco 
Michigan State University (Sociology and History) 
 
In the Shadow of Empire and Nation: Chilean Migration to the United States since the 1950s 
 
Migration is a critical event in the life of individuals and families. This event is defined by biographical and 
historical conditions, and it is part of a complex process within which the actual decision to migrate is a 
pivotal point. This complex process involves multilevel forces that impact personal and familial decisions 
and actions at every stage of the migration process: before the migration, while migrating, during the 
incorporation into the receiving society, and during possible return migration to the country of origin. 
Through the Chilean emigrants oral histories and memories, migration data (census and visas) and archival 
research, my research will uncover the particularities of the relationships between the biographical aspects of 
the decision to migrate and the structures and historical frameworks within which these decisions take place. 
In my research I position the emigrant at the center of the migration experience while maintaining the 
relevance of macro structures. I analyze the macro (the state within the world-system), meso (social 
institutions) and micro (individual biography) inter-related components of post World War II Chilean 
migration to the United States, particularly to Illinois and Michigan. I compare the emigration in four 
historical periods in Chilean history; the modernization before 1973, the exile (1973-1982); the neoliberal 
dictatorship (1982-1990); and the neoliberal democracy (post 1990). This migrations occurs within a context 
of continuous social, political, and economic change in the country of origin, Chile; a context that is shaped 
by global policies enacted by the country of destination, the United States.  
 
Dissertation committee: Brendan Mullan (Co-Chair), Alesia Montgomery, Stephanie Nawyn (Sociology); 
Peter Beattie (Co-Chair), Leslie Moch, and & Edward Murphy (History)  
 
Research Interests: I am interested in the relationships between the emigrants and their state of origin. My 
research intersects macro-historical dynamics, demographics, and memory constructions of the Southern 
Cone of America (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) post 1930. I am also interested on the pedagogical aspects 
of using cinema in teaching Sociology and History.  
 
E-mail: cristian.dona@gmail.com 
Website: cristiandonareveco.com  
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Laura R. Ford 
Cornell University 
 
A Case of Semantic Legal Ordering: The Emergence and Expansion of Intellectual Property 
 
In my dissertation, I undertake an historical and comparative investigation of the emergence and expansion of 
intellectual property (patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets). The historical and geographic sweep 
of the dissertation is broad, ranging from guild protections in medieval European city-states to the English 
Statute of Monopolies (1624), patent and copyright laws of the early French Revolutionary period, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, and the America Invents Act (2011). From a theoretical perspective, I 
seek to accomplish two things: (1) to formulate a thesis about the causal process through which formal law 
makes a difference in social relationships, and (2) to show how that causal process either complements or 
conflicts with contemporary North American sociological theories. I argue that formal law makes a 
difference in social relationships through a causal process of “semantic legal ordering,” focusing on the ways 
that legal interpretation shapes institutions, organizations, and intentions. 
 
Dissertation Committee: Richard Swedberg (Chair), Mabel Berezin, Stephen L. Morgan 
 
Research Interests:  My other interests include (1) sociological theory, especially classical theory, (2) 
economic sociology and sociology of law, (3) sociological, political, and cultural history, (4) 
counterfactualist methods and the identification of causes in sociological theory, and (5) a broad range of 
“law and society” topics, particularly in relation to the contemporary welfare state. 
 
E-mail: lrf23@cornell.edu 
 
 
 
Lindsey Freeman 
New School for Social Research 
 
Longing for the Bomb: Atomic Nostalgia in a Post-Nuclear Landscape 
 
Can nostalgia for an atomic past, not only serve to spark remembrance for a bygone era, but also lead to 
critical thought that could affect social change now and in the future? Often connected to a sense of home or 
home-ness, nostalgic sites are places where we imagine that we fit, a community of which we are a part that 
circumstances have separated us from, but to which we long to return. If this is nostalgia, are there people 
that actually long for the atomic bomb, for the imagined hearth of the uranium production plant? In places 
that owe their existence to the dawn of the Atomic Age, the answer is yes. It is often forgotten that nuclear 
energy and weapons programs created real communities, in such places history, memory, and nostalgia meet 
in a landscape both lived and imagined, where they converge in ways that are sometimes unexpected and 
contradictory. It is at these points of tension where critical thought can emerge. Two decades after the close 
of the Cold War, a space has opened up for the renegotiation of atomic memories. Compared with the 
contaminated materials of the Atomic Age, historical memory has a much shorter half-life; in light of this 
fact questions about the nuclear past, present, and future are immediate and pressing. Through Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, one of the three secret cities created for the Manhattan Project, I engage in an ethnography of the 
American relationship to the rise and decline of the Atomic Age, an ethnography of failed atomic utopianism 
and atomic nostalgia as they are engaged in the post-nuclear present. 
  
Dissertation Committee: Vera Zolberg (Chair), Jeffrey Goldfarb, Oz Frankel, Elzbieta Matynia 
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Research Interests: Historical Sociology, Cultural Sociology, Sociology of Memory, Sociology of Science 
and Technology  
 
E-mail: freel374@newschool.edu 
Website: www.newschool.edu/nssr/subpage.aspx?id=70859 
 
 
 
Kevan Harris 
Johns Hopkins University, 2012 
(2012-13 Post-Doctoral Fellow at Princeton University, Near Eastern Studies Department) 
 
The Martyrs Welfare State: Politics and Social Policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
My dissertation asks two questions. First, why has the post-revolutionary state in Iran endured for decades 
despite war, social conflict, and economic turmoil? Second, was 2009’s “Green movement” in Tehran a 
negation of the events of 1979 or was it a lineage of the Iranian revolution itself? Drawing on sixteen months 
of fieldwork from 2007-2011 in several Iranian provinces, including interviews with government officials 
and participant observation of the Green movement itself, I argue that the post-revolutionary state in Iran 
remained resilient because its state-building project intertwined with a welfare-building project.  I examine 
how the Islamic Republic created and relied on a set of welfare institutions which channeled the social 
mobilizations of the 1979 revolution and 1980-88 war with Iraq into a warfare-welfare complex. This 
broadened the social base of the state while also constraining its capacity for top-down projects steered by 
state elites. A subsequent attempt within the Islamic Republic to create a developmental project, one with its 
own loyal educated and technocratic cadres, expanded the middle class through social welfare policies. Yet 
this developmental push, common to many middle-income countries, generated new expectations among the 
population for upward mobility, changed livelihoods, and an alternative cultural/political order. I argue that 
the large 2009 popular mobilization was an outcome of the various and conflicting lineages of state-building 
efforts by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the response to those efforts by newly empowered social classes. 
 
Research Interests: My future project, originating from the Iranian case, will situate the ongoing uprisings in 
the Middle East within various development trajectories of middle-income states in the global South.  I also 
have two projects related to the historical sociology of development. First, I am pursuing research detailing 
the paradox of parallel processes which contribute a global wealth gap and a global welfare convergence. 
Second, I examine the contradictions of various developmental strategies, such as industrial “upgrading” and 
resource extraction, as they produce “adding-up” problems at the global level. 
 
Dissertation Committee: Giovanni Arrighi, Beverly Silver 
 
 
 
Damon Mayrl 
University of California, Berkeley, 2011 
 
Secular Conversions: Politics, Institutions, and Religious Education in the United States and Australia, 
1800-2000 
 
Although sociologists have increasingly abandoned the assumption that secularization is an inevitable 
byproduct of modernity, they have yet to develop a compelling account for why otherwise similar modern 
countries nevertheless accord religion substantially different roles in public life. I engage this problem by 
examining how the United States and Australia came to develop contrasting policies toward religious 
education in the late twentieth century. Despite many political, constitutional, and demographic similarities, 
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and despite sharing nearly identical sets of policies at the end of the nineteenth century, the two nations 
evolved distinctive and novel arrangements governing religious education in the years after World War II. 
Drawing on insights from institutional theory and historical sociology, I account for these divergent “secular 
settlements” by detailing how three common political processes (religious conflict, professionalization, and 
state-building) were differently refracted through each nation’s distinctive administrative, judicial, and 
electoral institutions. American political institutions constituted a “permeable state” which facilitated the 
progress of these processes, while Australian institutions constituted an “insulated state” which inhibited 
them. Based on this analysis, I develop a novel “political-institutional” approach to secularization which 
argues that variations in secularization stem, not simply from broad modernizing trends or the self-interested 
calculations of political leaders, but instead from the interaction of multiple general secularizing processes 
and particular political institutions. And I reveal that, both by mediating political and professional conflict 
and by actively calling into being the very actors who subsequently seek more secular policies, the state is a 
key factor in explaining variation in secularization. 
 
 
 
 
Jules Naudet 
Postdoctoral Fellow, Centre Maurice Halbwachs (ENS-EHESS), Paris, France. 
 
Comparative Analysis of the Experience of Upward Intergenerational Social Mobility in the United States, in 
France and in India (in French) 
 
My dissertation proposes a comparative analysis of the experience of upward social mobility in the United 
States, in India, and in France. It is based on approximately 150 interviews conducted among people from 
modest backgrounds who achieved prestigious positions in the higher ranks of civil service, in the private 
sector and in academia. These three countries are often cited as paradigmatic cases by sociologists who try to 
theorize the links between social mobility and social stratification systems. The United-States are thus 
typically perceived as the archetype of an open society characterized by few obstacles to mobility and by 
social statuses considered as achieved. Conversely, India is frequently described as the archetype of a closed 
society marked by the weight of the caste system and by social statuses considered as ascribed. Between the 
model of a closed society and that of an open society, French society seems to be more structured by the 
notion of social classes that continues to shape the analysis of its system of stratification. These three models 
are deeply rooted in sociological thought and they influence the way these three countries are apprehended. 
The first thread of my dissertation questions these categories of international comparison by drawing on the 
empirical research conducted in these three countries using the same protocol of investigation. The second 
thread consists in a discussion of the conceptual tools that are most often used by sociologists to understand 
the experience of upward social mobility.    
 
Dissertation Committee: Marie Duru-Bellat (Sciences Po), Christophe Jaffrelot (CNRS), Michèle Lamont 
(Harvard University), Marco Oberti (Sciences Po), Serge Paugam (CNRS, EHESS), Olivier Schwartz 
(L’université Paris V). 
 
Research Interests: I am currently involved in a new comparative research focusing on self-segregation 
among upper-class neighborhoods of Paris, Delhi and São Paulo. We more particularly try to understand how 
the wish to live in these highly segregated neighborhoods can be explained by specific representations of the 
poor. 
 
E-mail: julesnaudet@hotmail.com 
Website: www.cmh.ens.fr/hopmembres.php?action=ficheperso&id=452 
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Matthew Nichter 
University of Wisconsin – Madison 
 
Rethinking the Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Radicals, Repression, and the Black Freedom Struggle, 
1930-1970 
 
I argue that a mass movement for African-American equality had begun to emerge by the mid-1940s, largely 
under the auspices of labor unions and leftist political parties. However, the repression of radicals during the 
McCarthy era delayed the emergence of this nascent civil rights movement and weakened its ties to the labor 
movement. Notwithstanding these discontinuities, I also demonstrate that many activists with backgrounds in 
the Old Left struggles of the 1930s and 1940s played key leadership roles in the resurgent civil rights 
movement of the 1960s. These findings challenge canonical analyses of the origins of the civil rights 
movement, and shed new light on the historical roots of contemporary racial inequality. 
 
Dissertation Committee: Erik Olin Wright (Chair), Pamela Oliver, Chad Alan Goldberg, William P. Jones 
(History) 
 
Research Interests: Comparative and Historical Sociology, Political Sociology, Social Movements, Race, 
Labor, Political Economy, Theory, Philosophy of Science 
  
E-mail: mnichter@ssc.wisc.edu 
 
 
 
Shiri Noy 
Indiana University – Bloomington 
 
Globalization, International Financial Institutions and Health Policy Reform in Latin 
America 
 
This multimethod dissertation uses the case of health sector reform in Latin America to test the thesis that 
international financial institutions (IFIs) have used their coercive financial power to uniformly impose 
neoliberal policies in developing nations. I use cross-section time-series models to examine the overall 
impact of IFIs on health spending. I then draw on evidence from 300 policy documents and over 100 
interviews with policy makers and stakeholders in Argentina, Costa Rica and Peru to account for cross-
national variation in health policy reform. To date, I have three main findings. First, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, international financial institutions have little effect on health expenditures in Latin America. 
Second, IFI policy prescriptions are neither uniformly applied across countries, nor are they strictly 
“neoliberal.” Neoliberal concerns with market efficiency, privatization and individual responsibility are 
discussed in tandem with a state-responsibility discourse on equity and poverty-reduction. Third, institutional 
arrangements such as degree of decentralization and state autonomy and capacity – that is, whether the state 
formulates clear goals for the health sector and whether it is able to carry those goals to fruition – shape the 
extent to which IFIs are able to influence health policy reform in Argentina, Costa Rica and Peru. This 
research contributes to our understanding of the process of transmission of IFI policy prescriptions and their 
reception, negotiation and implementation by developing countries’ governments. 
 
Research Interests: Political Sociology, Sociology of Development, Globalization, Health 
Policy, Comparative Methods, Latin America 
 
E-mail: snoy@indiana.edu  
Website: www.shirinoy.com 
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Jung Mee Park 
Cornell University 
 
International Legal Norms and Domestic Polities: The Transformative Effects of 19
th
 Century Bilateral 
Treaties 
 
In my dissertation, I examine 19th century bilateral treaties as they pertain to the development and 
standardization of international law globally.  After writing treaties with Western states (US, Great Britain, 
Germany, etc.), East Asian countries (China, Japan, and Korea) adopted new legal terminologies, radically 
reorganized, and institutionalized new models of statehood.  During this time, China’s status within Asia 
declined, Japan emerged as a world power, and Korea, a once sovereign nation, became a colonial site. For 
the dissertation, I constructed a dataset of 228 treaties involving 123 unique dyadic relations for countries 
from Europe, Asia, North America, and South America. The treaties were coded for legal, diplomatic, 
political, commercial, and social provisions. Over time, the concluded treaties corresponded to specific 
categories such as arbitrage, consular, delimitation, and extradition treaties to handle various claims.  My 
analysis shows that intra and inter-regional tensions shaped treaty provisions and determined whether the 
treaty was symmetrically beneficial or asymmetrically beneficial. Treaties tended toward mutual benefits by 
the early 20th century as inter-regional tensions declined.  My analysis also explores how the treaties allowed 
foreign nationals to establish lasting educational, scientific, and religious institutions in East Asian countries. 
 
Dissertation Committee: David Strang (Chair), Mabel Berezin, Katsuya Hirano (History) 
 
Research Interests: I previously wrote on the history of Christianity (particularly in Korea), religion and 
nationalism, post-colonialism, and sociology of culture (particularly American musical theatre). Currently, I 
am writing a paper on the dyadic network ties in international diplomatic exchanges from 1817 to 2005, 
which examines the stability of symmetric and asymmetric ties. 
 
E-mail: jmp243@cornell.edu 
Website: sites.google.com/site/jmp2114/ 
 
 
 
Oren Pizmony-Levy 
Indiana University – Bloomington 
 
Testing for All: The Emergence and Development of International Assessments of Students’ Achievements 
1958-2008 
 
International assessments of students’ achievements (IASA) – such as Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study (TIMSS) and Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) – appear to be a vital 
catalyst in the globalization of education. Currently, one-third of all countries participate in these 
assessments. Still, empirical research on the IASA is less extensive than might be expected. My dissertation 
investigates the emergence and global diffusion of IASA over the past five decades. My point of departure is 
neo-institutional theory and its application to globalization; I extend this theoretical framework by exploring 
processes taking place at both global and local levels. Using archival research and interviews with 45 key-
informants, I demonstrate how the field of IASA has developed in two phases. In the early decades (1960s-
1980s), actors working in the field framed their work in terms of academic and intellectual endeavor (e.g., 
official reports were guided by specific research questions). Since the mid-1990s, however, actors working in 
the field frame their work in terms of global governance and auditing of educational systems (e.g., official 
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reports include more ranking tables and less research questions). I explain this development by examining the 
central role of the United States in the field of IASA. Furthermore, using original quantitative dataset, I show 
how regional and global factors, rather than national characteristics, affect the likelihood of countries to 
participate in IASA.  
 
Dissertation Committee: Brian Powell (Co-Chair), Margaret Sutton (Co-Chair), Arthur Alderson, Heidi 
Ross, Pamela Barnhouse Walters 
 
Research Interests: Comparative Sociology / Education, Sociology of Education, Political Sociology, 
Environmental Sociology, LGBT Studies, Quantitative and Qualitative Methods, Social Networks 
 
Email: opizmony@indiana.edu 
Website: www.orenpizmonylevy.com 
 
 
 
Jennifer Rosen 
Northwestern University 
 
Political Institutions, Development Thresholds, and Women's Political Representation 
 
Jennifer Rosen’s dissertation offers a new explanation of cross-national and over-time variation in levels of 
female political representation. She shows that key causal mechanisms have different –even contradictory– 
effects on female representation across countries with diverse socio-economic histories.  Using a nested 
analysis that combines quantitative and qualitative methods, she systematically examines the interaction 
between political institutions and economic development in mitigating or reinforcing social inequalities.  She 
pays particular attention to women's political empowerment in African and Latin American post-conflict 
societies.  Results indicate that the specific kinds of political institutions that enhance female political 
representation are radically different in developed vs. less developed countries.  Hence, institutional 
designers need to take into consideration the economic context of a country in order to promote more 
balanced political representation for women. 
 
Dissertation Committee: James Mahoney (Chair), Monica Prasad, Jeremy Freese, Alberto Palloni 
 
Research Interests: Her research interests focus on the intersection of politics, gender, and international 
development, as well as the use of innovative social science research methods. Jennifer has a forthcoming 
article (sole author) on the topic of women's representation in Political Research Quarterly.  
 
E-mail: jenniferrosen2014@u.northwestern.edu  
Website: www.sociology.northwestern.edu/people/marketphds.html#rosen 
 
 
 
Ashley T. Rubin 
University of California, Berkeley (Jurisprudence and Social Policy) 
 
Accounts of the Separate System: Organizational Legitimacy and Eastern State Penitentiary, 1829-1930 
 
How do officials in perpetually vulnerable organizations seek to protect their organization’s legitimacy? An 
understudied organization, prisons are perpetually vulnerable as they employ problematic technologies to 
achieve ambiguous (often conflicting) goals that are often difficult to evaluate. I offer a longitudinal study of 
an extreme case: Eastern State Penitentiary (1829–1930). One of the first American prisons, Eastern 
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represented an experiment with a new, untested technology and no systematic means of evaluation. As a 
state-run organization, it often faced funding problems that led to embarrassing gaps between theory and 
practice. Most importantly, Eastern’s “separate system” of inmate confinement was an exceptional practice in 
an increasingly isomorphic penal field, subjecting it to intense field-wide criticism. Drawing on a range of 
public and private, ephemeral and regularly produced primary-source documents, I demonstrate that 
organizational officials utilized organizational accounts rooted in institutions that intersected the penal field. 
By signaling their adherence to legitimate norms, values, and understandings, they sought to compensate for 
the legitimacy they lost through their deviant formal structures. Although officials often relied more heavily 
on these accounts in times of explicit threats to the autonomy of the prison, the accounts ultimately became 
institutionalized over time, becoming part of the formal structure of the organization making it at least in part 
isomorphic with its environment. 
  
Dissertation Committee: Malcolm Feeley (Chair), Cybelle Fox, Calvin Morrill, Jonathan Simon 
 
Research Interests: (Formal) Social Control, Organizational Theory, Law and Society, Historical Sociology, 
Methodology 
 
Email: atrubin@berkeley.edu 
 
 
Hiroe Saruya 
University of Michigan 
Democracy and Protests in Japan: The Development of Movement Fields and the 1960 Anpo Protests 
My dissertation examines contestations and practices of democracy during the 1960 Anpo Protests—the 
massive social movement that coalesced to combat the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. 
The dissertation looks at the transitions that occurred within the U.S.-enforced democratic sphere from 1945 
through 1960, during and after the occupation. The research is based on 18 months of fieldwork, including 
archival research and about 100 in-depth interviews with former protest participants. By focusing on 
intellectuals, student protest groups, and workers, I analyze how and why each of these three groups 
developed its own movement prior to their convergence in the Anpo Protests in 1960. I draw upon Pierre 
Bourdieu’s concept of field to show how each group developed its own movement field, and how actors 
therein engaged in struggles in accordance with the specific rules and practices within that field. I argue that 
the 1960 Anpo protests were not a single coherent movement, but rather an aggregation of different kinds of 
social movements, each of which was internally comprised of distinct movement dynamics. I then analyze 
how the 1960 Anpo protests served as a political opportunity for each of these groups to achieve previously 
determined political goals specific to their group. Finally, I show that the practice of democracy, forged 
during the post-World War II period, provided a shared context that served to coordinate their collective 
protests.  
Dissertation Committee: George Steinmetz (Chair), Genevieve Zubrzycki, Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Michael 
Kennedy, Jennifer Robertson  
Research Interests: Comparative Historical Sociology, Political Sociology, Classical and Contemporary 
Theory, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Social Movements and Social Change, the Sociology of Japan and Asia  
E-mail: hsaruya@umich.edu 
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Ritchie Savage 
The New School for Social Research 
 
A Comparative Analysis of Populist Discourse in Venezuela and the United States 
 
My dissertation investigates the way in which political discourse is structured in order to appeal to the 
people. Through an analysis of speeches and articles covering Betancourt’s Democratic Action, Chávez, 
McCarthyism, and the Tea Party, I argue that there is an essential structure to populist discourse revealed in 
references to the ‘opposition’ as a representation of the persistence of social conflict. In the discourses of 
these politicians and social movements, references to the opposition are posed against a ‘founding moment of 
the social,’ which serves as a collective memory of the origins of democracy and the strive for freedom or 
liberation. With evidence provided that this binary structure is present in all of the aforementioned cases, I 
conclude that populism is a case of a universal discursive formation, which can emerge in administrations, 
social movements, and ideologies with vastly different characteristics. I then utilize this definition of 
populism to reveal that instances of populism, which once proved to be exceptional phenomena within 
modern forms of political rule, are now becoming part of the institutionalized structure of democratic 
politics, evidenced by a number of cases taken in comparative-historical perspective. 
 
Dissertation Committee: Orville Lee (Chair), Andrew Arato, Sarah Daynes, Federico Finchelstein 
 
Research Interests: My other research interests include an ongoing inquiry into the role of ‘language’ as an 
analytic construct in the social sciences and how it has been deployed within social and cultural theory in 
such a manner to create a fundamental set of recurring antinomies between its structuralist, psychoanalytic, 
Marxist-historical, performative, and phenomenological applications. 
 
E-mail: savar647@newschool.edu  
Website: www.newschool.edu/nssr/subpage.aspx?id=70857 
 
 
 
Ben Scully 
Johns Hopkins University 
 
Development in the Age of Wagelessness: Labor, Livelihoods, and the Decline of Work in South Africa 
 
My dissertation examines how the decline of formal wage labor in South Africa has shaped both the 
developmental strategies available to the state and the political strategies available to trade unions. South 
Africa has experienced one of the highest levels of unemployment in the world over the past decade. The 
consensus among a wide range of scholars is that such levels of unemployment have produced an economic 
and social divide between the country's remaining formal wage workers and the un- and underemployed 
“wageless” majority of the labor force. My dissertation research draws on an analysis of national household 
surveys and NSF-sponsored I conducted in 2010-2011. Using this data, I argue that divisions between 
workers and the wageless are not as sharp as is often assumed once we look beyond individuals' workplace 
experiences and into their households and kinship networks. The vast majority of South African households 
rely on livelihood strategies that combine multiple sources of income from both wage and non-wage sources. 
Instead of a socioeconomic divide, there is widespread interdependence between workers and the wageless. 
My findings point to broadly utilized sources of livelihood—such as land, small enterprises, and government 
social spending—which can be the focus of effective and popularly supported developmental strategies, even 
if economic policy is not successful in broadly expanding formal wage labor. My work also highlights the 
possibility for unions in countries like South Africa to expand their political constituencies by taking up 
Trajectories               Vol. 23, No. 2         Spring 2012 
45 
issues beyond the workplace which have direct economic impact on their members and the unorganized 
majority. 
 
Dissertation Committee: Beverly Silver, William Martin (SUNY-Binghamton), Rina Agarwala 
 
Research Interests: Economic Development, Labor and Social Movements, State Welfare Policy, 
Comparative Historical Sociology. 
 
Contact: benscully@jhu.edu 
 
 
 
Kristen Shorette 
University of California, Irvine 
 
Fair Trade Certified: The Institutionalization of Nongovernmental Regulation of Global Markets 
 
My dissertation research, supported by the NSF, examines the uneven rise of Fair Trade Organizations 
(FTOs) as market-oriented social justice organizations.  Using original data on all current and former FTOs, 
and time series and panel regression analyses, I examine (1) the rise of FTOs over time, (2) cross-national 
variation in the concentration of fair trade (FT) producer organizations across the global South, and (3) cross-
national variation in the amount of FT goods consumed within developed countries. Examining proliferation 
of FTOs since 1960, I find that the rise of these organizations is not simply related to global inequality and 
environmental degradation, but that these issues become problematized with the rise of new world cultural 
norms supporting equality, human rights, and environmentalism carried by INGOs. Further, FTOs grow as 
economic liberalization increases, suggesting the applicability of the Polanyian double-movement to the 
global level. Examining concentration of FT producers across the global South, I find evidence not only of 
top down diffusion via international organizations and colonial legacies but also of  lateral diffusion 
processes via networks of Peace Corps volunteers. This agentic model of diffusion is consistent with work in 
economic sociology that highlights the importance of social ties for economic activity. Finally, the 
examination of cross-national FT consumption patterns reveals the relevance of organizational structure over 
individual altruism, whereby the widespread and mainstream availability of FT goods most strongly predicts 
the amount of national consumption. Overall, my research identifies the cultural and structural underpinnings 
of global markets, and the importance of non-state actors in their governance.  
  
Dissertation Committee: Nina Bandelj (Co-Chair), Ann Hironaka, Evan Schofer (Co-Chair) 
 
Research Interests: In addition, I conduct cross-national and over-time comparative research on how cultural, 
political, and economic forces influence a variety of outcomes in the areas of the natural environment, human 
health, and human rights. I am particularly interested in engaging both world society and political economy 
perspectives. 
 
Email: kshorett@uci.edu 
Website: www.sociology.uci.edu/socio_grad_profile/kshorett 
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Sourabh Singh 
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 
 
Dynamics of Political Field Structure in a Democratizing State: India, 1947-1984 
 
In my dissertation research, I have empirically examined Bourdieu’s claim that the ontological unity between 
field and subjects simultaneously creates conditions for both field reproduction and transformation. I have 
investigated the logic of field reproduction and transformation by studying changes in the relational positions 
of 4,000 parliamentarians within the Indian political field from 1947 to 1984. My data sources are the ‘Data 
Handbook on Elections in India,’ ‘Who’s Who of the Indian Parliament,’ and published biographies of 
prominent Indian parliamentarians. To illustrate changes in the structure of the Indian political field, I have 
used Network Analysis, Multiple Correspondence Analysis, and Logistic Regression modeling, as well as 
biographical descriptions of parliamentarians’ everyday political interactions. An article discussing my study 
of the transformation of the relational structure of the Indian political field in the late 1960s and the resultant 
rise of Indira Gandhi in Indian politics, in spite of her being a symbolically devalued female politician, is 
forthcoming in Theory and Society. Also, a manuscript based on my study of the formation of the particular 
political habitus of Gandhian-era parliamentarians resulting from their differential exposure to various 
capitals of the Indian political field during the Nehruvian era is currently under review. I am currently 
preparing a manuscript based on my study of the friction between the evolving relational structure of the 
Indian political field and the Jayaprakash (JP) movement in the mid-1970s, which led to the only 
authoritarian interlude in the history of postcolonial Indian politics. 
 
Dissertation Committee: Paul McLean (Chair), Ann Mische, Ethel Brooks 
 
Research Interests: I am interested in exploring Bourdieu’s discussion of the symbolic power of state by 
studying how the emergency state in India (1975-77) lost its symbolic power. I am also interested in 
exploring the ethical foundation of Bourdieu’s field theory by scrutinizing the presence of symbolic violence 
in violent and non-violent protest strategies. 
 
E-mail: ssingh@sociology.rutgers.edu 
 
 
Michelle Smirnova 
University of Maryland, College Park 
 
The Construction of “We”: The Russo-Soviet Anektod in a Cultural Context 
 
The way by which nationality and citizenship are codified in law or used by political entrepreneurs to 
mobilize populations is different from how individuals make sense of themselves.  Although sharing a 
particular attribute or physical connection offers some sort of relational identity, it is the product of belonging 
both to a category and network of individuals in addition to the feeling of belonging which produces a 
bounded groupness (Tilly 1978; Anderson 1983/2006; Brubaker 2000).  It is often difficult for historians to 
get at such feelings of groupness or nationness except through means of self-identification (a labeling 
process), but I believe that the Soviet Russian anekdot—a politically subversive joke—provides an intimate 
view into the perspective of the Russian people living under the Soviet regime.  The anekdot serves as a 
discourse of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld 1999), in that it serves to deface or expose the public secret (Taussig 
1997) that Soviet citizens are prohibited from voicing.  It also serves to reify the top-down definition of an 
“imagined community”.  Beyond its transgressive properties, politically subversive texts like the anekdot 
articulate the details of an intimate set of knowledges that insiders “are taught not to know”.  In my 
dissertation I look at how the characters and narratives construct (1) the boundaries of “we”—who belongs 
and who does not by exploring how different groups are “marked” in the anekdoty, (2) how the collectivity 
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negotiates their understanding of leaders, institutions and State propaganda as a means of rejecting or reifying 
aspects of Soviet power, and (3) what sort of collective memory and identity is conveyed through the 
expressions of the public secret, nostalgia and/or regret. The anekdot reveals power dynamics at multiple 
levels: within the family, between ethnic groups and geographical regions, and between people and state.  
Together these multiple identities and relationships express a form of collectivity among Russians. 
 
Dissertation Committee: Meyer Kestnbaum, Patricia Hill Collins, Melissa Milkie, Patricio Korzenwitz, 
Vladimir Tismaneanu 
 
Research Interests: My broad theoretical interests are upon collective identity and memory, nationalism, 
culture and discourse.  I have worked at the Census Bureau on several projects pertaining to perceived racial 
and ethnic identities among US residents and about levels of trust in the Federal government. 
 
E-mail: Smirnova@umd.edu 
Website: www.michellesmirnova.com 
 
 
 
Nicolás M. Somma 
University of Notre Dame, 2011 
(Assistant Professor of Sociology, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile) 
 
When the Powerful Rebel. Armed Insurgency in Nineteenth-Century Latin America 
 
By assuming that insurgencies come “from below” – i.e., are launched by exploited and deprived social 
groups – existing theories are not suited for explaining insurgencies “from above” – i.e., led by political, 
social, and economic elites. When most insurgencies come “from above”, why do insurgency levels vary 
across countries? In nineteenth-century Latin America insurgencies of this kind were very common. 
Therefore, I compare two countries with high insurgency (Colombia and Uruguay) and two with low 
insurgency (Chile and Costa Rica) during the century after independence (ca. 1820-1920). Three factors help 
explaining variations in insurgency levels. The first one is the strength of the ties between peasants and 
landowners. Strong ties allow landowners to use selective incentives for mobilizing their subordinates into 
rebel armies. Conversely, weak vertical ties reduce selective incentives and obstruct mobilization. This 
complements theories about insurgencies “from below”, which assume that weak vertical 
ties increase insurgency. The second factor is the timing of consolidation of the central state. Early state 
consolidation increases the costs of insurgency and leads government opponents to engage in other strategies 
(elections, informal agreements, and/or military coups). Conversely, late consolidation encourages an early 
resort to insurgency, which becomes self-reinforcing and persists even after the state consolidates. By 
emphasizing the timing of state consolidation I complement political opportunity and state breakdown 
theories, which overlook how past events shape outcomes across time. The third factor is the type of party 
system. Two-party systems simplify the process of blame attribution, allow the party in power to exclude its 
opponent, and encourage leaders to emphasize extreme positions for capturing the support of small and 
highly militant electorates. This increases polarization and boosts insurgency. Conversely, because in multi-
party systems parties are unable to govern alone, they are encouraged to engage in flexible electoral and 
congressional alliances that decrease polarization and therefore insurgency. Consistent with this argument, in 
Colombia and Uruguay vertical ties were strong, central states consolidated late, and two-party systems 
polarized, leading to high insurgency. In Chile and Costa Rica vertical ties were weak, states consolidated 
early, and multi-party systems did not polarize, leading to low insurgency. 
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Mark D. Whitaker 
University of Wisconsin – Madison, 2008 
 
Ecological Revolution: The Political Origins of Environmental Degradation and the Environmental Origins 
of Axial Religions; China, Japan, Europe 
 
Most argue environmental movements are a novel feature of world politics. I argue that they are a durable 
feature of a degradative political economy. Past or present, environmental politics became expressed in 
religious change movements as oppositions to state environmental degradation using discourses available. 
Ecological Revolution describes characteristics why our historical states collapse and because of these 
characteristics are opposed predictably by religio-ecological movements. As a result, origins of our large 
scale humanocentric 'axial religions' are connected to anti-systemic environmental movements. Many major 
religious movements of the past were 'environmentalist' by being health, ecological, and economic 
movements, rolled into one. Since ecological revolutions are endemic to a degradation-based political 
economy, they continue today. China, Japan, and Europe are analyzed over 2,500 years showing how religio-
ecological movements get paired against chosen forms of state-led environmental degradation in a 
predictable fashion. I argue that the formation of unrepresentative political clientelism/jurisdictions is 
responsible for environmental degradation. The process of environmental degradation is argued to be caused 
by unrepresentative state elite organizational changes in environmental and social relations for their own 
short-term political economic benefits though with bad long-term consequences. 
 
Dissertation Committee: Joseph Elder, Frederick Buttel, Daniel Kleinman, Charles Halaby 
 
Research Interests: Environmental Sociology, Comparative Historical Sociology, Political Sociology, World 
Regional Sociology, Information Society, Social Stratification and Inequality, State/Cultural Interactions, 
Social Welfare and Quality of Life Research, Comparative Development, Social Movements, Sociology of 
Science/Medicine, Consumption and Material Choices as a Politicized Infrastructure, Comparative 
Constitutional Engineering Effects on Representation and Sustainability. 
 
E-mail: mwhitake@ssc.wisc.edu 
Websites: biostate.blogspot.com, commodityecology.blogspot.com 
 
 
 
Daniel Williams 
(Visiting Assistant Professor, Carleton College) 
 
Citizens, Foreigners or Germans? The State and Persons of Immigrant Background in the Making of 
Membership in Germany since 1990 
 
My dissertation examines recent changes in citizenship in contemporary Germany and their impact on 
understandings of nationness and belonging.  It combines a historical-comparative analysis of how 
citizenship policy at the level of the state has changed since 1990 with interview and ethnographic data 
drawn from immigrants and the children of immigrants about their understandings of citizenship and self-
identification as German.  Previous scholarship has shown that nationness has been a key category for the 
making of citizenship policies.  A similar relationship may be posited for individuals, who may relate 
citizenship and nationness.  Furthermore, understandings of citizenship and nationness which are 
institutionalized in the state may inform the understandings of persons of immigrant background. Since 1990, 
access to citizenship in Germany has become more liberalized for persons of immigrant background.  
Contrary to scholarship emphasizing nationally-specific traditions of citizenship, as well as convergence 
theories based on global or universal norms around citizenship, this dissertation shows that these changes 
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after 1990 are explained largely by political parties’ narratives about immigrants and foreigners, Germany 
and the nation, and the meaning of citizenship. In the context of the liberalization of citizenship policies, the 
majority of immigrant-descended individuals do self-identify as German, largely based on their everyday 
cultural practices and through language.  However, they simultaneously articulate a sense of non-Germanness 
through appearance, name and other markers of descent.  Additionally, persons of immigrant background 
tend to disconnect citizenship from Germanness.  They tend to view their citizenship as neither a means to, 
nor reflection of, Germanness.   
 
Research Interests: Comparative Race and Ethnicity, International Migration, Intersectionality, Qualitative 
Methods, Global and Transnational Sociology, Culture 
 
E-mail: dwilliams@carleton.edu 
 
 
 
Xiaohong Xu 
Yale University 
 
Revolutionizing Ethos: Making ‘New Men’ and New Politics in the Chinese Revolution 
 
Based on an empirical study of the Chinese Revolution, my dissertation argues that the revolutionary process 
can best be understood with reference to the dynamic triadic relationship among civil society, competitive 
party politics, and evolving state institutions. I investigate the organizational emergence of the ‘new men’ 
who made their way from civic activism into politics, and the process in which these Communist 
revolutionaries developed a new organizational ethos and diffused it into civil society and eventually into the 
party-state. Based on extensive use of archival and historical materials and interviews, I discover that 
Chinese Communism emerged from youth activist organizations with strong sectarian ethical culture; their 
agenda of social transformation was fused with a group ethos derived from this sectarian base. Their rise in 
the political arena disrupted the weak parliamentary politics of the time, and reconfigured the relationship 
between civil society and party politics. Finally, I examine the formation and consequences of the resulting 
Maoist political culture: its resurgent sectarian ethics fostered a highly disciplined cadre crucial for its rise to 
power yet also incurred organizational dynamics within the Party which, after the ‘new men’ took power, 
frequently led to policy disasters. 
 
Dissertation Committee: Julia Adams, Philip Gorski, Peter Perdue, Steve Pincus 
 
Research Interests: My next project will draw on organizational theory and network analysis to analyze the 
transformation and reproduction of cultural institutions and cultural elites in contemporary China in order to 
understand why the major political rupture taking place in 1989 has given way to political resilience in the 
following two decades. 
 
E-mail: xiaohong.xu@yale.edu 
Website: xiaohongxu.org/ 
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The Comparative and Historical Sociology Section currently has 657 members, down 7 (about 1%) since last 
year. The ASA Section average is down about 4%. We also have 31.4% of our members who are students. 
The ASA Section average is 30%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Call for Member Information 
 
Let’s make sure that the website of the Comparative and Historical Sociology section 
remains a vibrant hub of intellectual exchange! Please keep the Web Editor updated 
with your latest information, including: (1) the current link to your professional 
webpage; (2) citation information and links to your latest article and book publications; 
(3) announcements and calls for upcoming jobs, conferences, and publications pertain-
ing to comparative and historical sociology. And be sure to visit the website 
(http://www2.asanet.org/sectionchs/) to learn about recent and upcoming section activi-
ties – and to browse current and back issues of the newsletter. 
 
Please email your information to Robert Jansen, CHS Web Editor: 
rsjansen@umich.edu. 
 
 
 
 
Contributions to Trajectories are always welcome: please contact the editors at 
atesaltinordu@sabanciuniv.edu and seio@hawaii.edu. 
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